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Constructivism and Lebanon’s Foreign Policy 
 
Rita Naoum 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the role of both domestic and foreign forces in the 
incapacity of Lebanon to draft a unified and coherent foreign policy.  It 
argues that domestic actors go into alliances with regional as well as 
international powers to maintain their share of the power in their continuous 
struggle for control. Consequently, sectarian and sub-national identities 
have been manipulated by these actors to retain their rule. Therefore, an 
analysis of Lebanese foreign policy requires examining the role of sectarian 
and sub-national identities and how they have been constructed to serve the 
interest of the ruling elite. It also requires an examination of the sectarian 
nature of the country’s political parties which have been mostly dominated 
by a single leader, otherwise known as the “Zaiim”.  In this regard, neither 
realism nor pluralism offer sufficient explanations of Lebanon’s foreign 
policy, or rather lack of it. The examination of Lebanon’s foreign policy 
requires a deeper look into the construction of identities in its complex 
society, the composition of state institutions and the rise of sectarianism as 
reflected in the composition of various political parties. Constructivism 
contributes in this regard by shedding the light on the primacy of identities 
and norms which are historically and socially created in determining a 
state’s behavior. This thesis, although acknowledges the limitation of 
constructivism,  examines the role of identities and how they have been 
shaped in Lebanon, paying particular consideration to the internal turmoil 
unleashed by the Syrian civil war and the failure of the Baabda Declaration 
followed by institutional deadlocks.  
 
 
Keywords: Foreign Policy, Lebanon, Constructivism, National Pact, Taif 
Accord, Baabda Declaration  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Situating the Thesis  
“Lebanon’s official foreign policy started when the country gained its 
independence in 1943”1. The characteristic of its foreign policy since that 
year onward has been highlighted by the relation of its state and non-state 
actors with various countries. In fact, Lebanon’s foreign policy reflects a 
“two-leveled game” with the intersection of both internal and external 
policies
2
. Not to anyone’s surprise, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Emigrants became one of the most significant and desired positions which 
parties fought over its control.   
Preceding the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 Lebanese foreign policies 
referred mainly to the National Pact; an oral “gentlemen’s agreement 
between Maronite President Bishara al-Khouri and Sunni Prime Minister 
Riyad al-Solh”3. In this arrangement, a balance was sought to reconcile 
“between Christian and Muslim expectations of Lebanon’s foreign policy to 
maintain cordial relations with the Arab states, a Muslim demand, but not at 
the expense of Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, a Christian 
demand”4. Therefore, Muslims will discard any plan to unite with Syria in 
return for Christian’s abandonment of Western tutelage, precisely from 
France.   
                                                          
1
 (Wilkins, 2013, p. 22) 
2
 (Salloukh B. , The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon, 2008, p. 283) 
3
 (Salloukh B. , The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon, 2008, p. 285) 
4
 (Salloukh B. , The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon, 2008, p. 285) 
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The conduct of the major policies in Lebanon and precisely that of its 
foreign policy were highly influenced by the presidency during that period
5
. 
The presidency before 1975 represented the most authoritative office in the 
country
6
.  The presidential powers as stated in the 1926 constitution 
“empowered the president to appoint prime ministers, appoint and dismiss 
cabinet ministers (Article 53), promulgate laws (Article 56), dissolve the 
parliament (Article 55) and negotiate and ratify international treaties 
(Article 52)”7. Despite this fact, the National Pact guaranteed that no faction 
or decision-maker was influential enough to manipulate the identity or 
decision making of the state. When it comes to international treaties and 
foreign policy, the president had to respect the statement of the National 
Pact insisted that that Lebanon’s foreign policy should respect both the 
country’s Arab face and special relations with the West8. However, in order 
to ensure the protection of the interest of other identity groups as stated by 
the national pact, it became more of a precedent that the Prime Minister 
would sign all decrees signed by the president, especially following the 
Shehabist era.  
By 1975, the historical mistrust and conflict between the various Lebanese 
sects prevailed and as the life span of the National Pact expired and the 
dispute deepened, Lebanon plunged into a civil war. The “civil war was the 
result of perceived injustices in the political system, as sectarian groups 
fought to both transform and maintain the status quo distribution of power 
                                                          
5
 (Salloukh B. , The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon, 2008, p. 286) 
6
 (Salloukh B. , The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon, 2008, p. 286) 
7
 (Salloukh B. F., 2013, p. 135) 
8
 (Salloukh B. F., 2013, p. 135) 
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and influence in the government”9. Exacerbating the problem is Lebanon 
geographic location which made it a center of the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
highly manipulated by Syria, Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia. External and 
domestic actors became determinant of the making of a foreign policy in the 
weak state of Lebanon
10
. 
The signing of the Taif Accord in 1989, an agreement interceded by both 
Saudi Arabia and the United States, brought a closure to the Lebanese 15-
years civil war. This agreement came to reinforce the out-of-date National 
Pact, bringing in a new division of power by reducing the power of the 
Maronite president, increasing the parliamentary seats and dividing them 
evenly among Christians and Muslims while preserving the same sectarian 
distribution of key positions that prevailed under the prewar agreement
11
. 
Adding to that, Article 54 of the Lebanese constitution stated that the 
“decisions of the President of the Republic must be countersigned by the 
Prime Minister and the minister or ministers concerned with the exception 
of the decree designating a new Prime Minister and the decree accepting the 
resignation of the Cabinet or considering it resigned” 12 . Thus “Decrees 
issuing laws must be countersigned by the Prime Minister”13. 
To sum it up, the Taif Accord revived the confessional system and 
exacerbated the distrust and marginalization sentiments among Christians. 
Adding to that, the Taif reflected clearly the Lebanese foreign policy that 
marked the beginning of the 90s until 2005; “it altered postwar foreign 
policymaking, and placed genuine constraints on the country’s foreign 
                                                          
9
 (Bloomquist, Gilchrist, & Indelicato , 2011, p. 4) 
10
 (Moubarak, 2003, p. 21) 
11
 (Bloomquist, Gilchrist, & Indelicato , 2011, p. 5) 
12
 (The Lebanese Constitution, 1997, p. 242) 
13
 (The Lebanese Constitution, 1997, p. 242) 
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policy choices”14. The postwar agreement states that Lebanon should not 
constitute a fertile ground for any activity that might pose a danger to the 
security of Syria and vice-versa
15
. This statement gave primacy to security 
policies and provided Syria with an alibi to interfere in Lebanon’s politics, 
whether domestic or foreign
16
. Thus, the disarmament of militias which was 
called for in the Taif Accord only applied to those who were not allied to 
Syria and the later became the most influential regional player in the 
country. The Taif Accord gave Syria a legal recognition to station its troops 
on Lebanese soils and committed Lebanon to bilateral treaties giving it 
privileges in all fields especially in regard to the negotiations with Israel as 
stated in the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination signed in 
1991
17
.  
In short, foreign policy conduct in prewar Lebanon was a presidential 
advantage, in other words a Christian privilege. Following the Taif Accord, 
it became more penetrated by the Muslims and especially the Shiites as the 
agreement shuffled the highest ministries which include the “Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Emigrants” among the leading sects in the country, 
being Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Sunnis and Shiites. From the National 
Pact to the Taif Accord, Lebanon’s foreign policy has been highly 
vulnerable to domestic rivalries and penetrated by external players. 
Lebanon’s inability to meet with the economic, social and security needs of 
its people classified the country as a weak state. A state is characterized as 
                                                          
14
 (Salloukh B. , The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon, 2008, p. 386) 
15
 (Moubarak, 2003, p. 21) 
16
 (Moubarak, 2003, p. 21) 
17
 In reference to the articles published by the United Nations-treaties series (Treaty of Brotherhood, 
Cooperation and Coordination, 1992) 
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weak when it fails to provide security, basic services and civil freedoms to 
its citizens.  
In other words, a weak state is one in which one or more of the following 
deficiencies exist; “security gap” which develops when a government fails 
to provide security. Thus, “rebellious armed groups or criminal nonstate 
actors may use violence to exploit this security gap”18. Another deficiency 
is known as the “capacity gap” when the government fails to “provide basic 
services such as education and health care to its citizens”19. Last but not 
least, the “legitimacy gap” which is the most dangerous and risky as it 
develops when the government is incapable of meeting the “needs to protect 
the basic rights and freedoms of its people, enforce the rule of law and allow 
broad-base participation in the political process”20. 
Weak states, like Lebanon, have gained international attention in post-cold 
war era as they “could breed terror, crime, instability and disease”21. The 
concern surrounding weak states escalated with the rise of Al-Qaeda and 
other terrorist groups. These non-state actors found weak states to be a 
fertile ground to launch their operation such as Al-Qaeda which “enjoyed 
the hospitality of two failed states, Sudan and Afghanistan, where it built 
training camps and enlisted new members”22. The capacity of these non-
state actors to act independently and conduct their own foreign policy and 
the inability of weak states to control them shifted the attention of the 
international community to these states and precisely to those located in the 
Middle East.  
                                                          
18
 (Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein, 2005, p. 136) 
19
 (Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein, 2005, p. 136) 
20
 (Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein, 2005, p. 136) 
21
 (Patrick, 2006, p. 2) 
22
 (Patrick, 2006, p. 5) 
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Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 which targeted the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States, the latter 
adopted a new strategy and gave higher importance to weak states in its 
foreign policy agenda
23
. Backed by France, the U.S successfully managed to 
advance United Nations Security Council Resolution 1595 which entailed 
the departure of all non-Lebanese forces from the country and the 
demilitarization of all actors except the military
24
. The resolution brought 
little fruit and Syria increased its control over Lebanon. 
However, the assassination of Rafik Hariri reinforced the position of the 
United States in Lebanon and forced Syria to cooperate with the 
international community by partially adhering to the previously mentioned 
resolution
25
. This resulted in the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from 
Lebanon and the organization of free elections, with US support, in 2005. 
As a result, expectations rose about the possibility that drafting foreign 
policy in a post-2005 Lebanon will be converted into more of a domestic 
affair. Nonetheless, as the Cedar Revolution divided the Lebanese between 
two camps- March 8 aligned with Iran and Syria and March 14 aligned with 
the West- the old dispute over Lebanon’s foreign policy was revived as the 
sectarian dispute for political control intensified.  
Sub-state foreign policies highlighted the post-Syria period in Lebanon in a 
changing regional politics as was reflected in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah 
war. Moreover, the increased rivalry among various Lebanese political 
groups over power control exposed the country to external interference.  
                                                          
23
 (Patrick, 2006, pp. 1-4) 
24
 (United Nation Security Council, 2005, p. 5) 
25
 The resolution also demanded the demarcations of borders between Lebanon and Syria which the 
latter neglected 
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1.2 Research Questions and Significance of Topic: 
This thesis aims at providing an analysis of the obstacles facing Lebanon’s 
foreign policy by examining the role of sectarian identities in its making. 
From this perspective, this paper aims at answering the following questions: 
How does constructivism help in explaining the attitude of different 
identities and their impact on foreign policy? How do external factors 
influence domestic actors and impact foreign policy? How did the elites in 
Lebanon construct sectarian identities? What purpose did it serve? How did 
these identities play as a constraint to Lebanon’s foreign policy?  
By examining the above questions, this thesis highlights that the obstacles 
to a Lebanese unified foreign policy are not merely found in the regional 
and international level of analysis, but also at the domestic level. In sum, 
this thesis argues that sectarian identities, which have developed in 
Lebanon, inhibits the creation of a unified consensus around many 
agreements dealing with its international affairs and opens a room for 
foreign intervention in its foreign affairs including external mediation as in 
the Cairo Agreement 1969, the Taif Accord 1989, and recently the Doha 
Agreement in 2008 thus posing a fundamental challenge to the making of a 
cohesive Lebanese foreign policy. 
1.3 Methodology 
This thesis employs the case-study method to examine how identity-
oriented parties and groups within Lebanon responded to the Syrian crisis. It 
explains their behavior vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis not only based on the 
balance of power theory but also based on the importance of their identities 
which constructivism helps in the explanation of their development and 
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construction. This case study highlights the importance of sub-national 
identities in the making of Lebanon’s foreign policy. The qualitative 
approach used in this thesis also refers to historical research. The latter 
helps understanding how identities and sectarianism have developed in 
Lebanon into its present forms taking into account the development of 
March 8 and March 14 identities. It also helps in understanding the 
continuous obstacles to Lebanon’s foreign policy. It also puts the Syrian 
crisis into context.  
This method employs both primary and secondary sources. The former 
consisting of newspapers articles (Al-Akhbar, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and 
The Daily Star), as the latter includes books, academic articles and internet 
references examining the literature on sectarianism in Lebanon as well as on 
the Lebanese foreign policy. It also refers to theoretical books which 
underline the main arguments of constructivism and the strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach in analyzing foreign policy.  
1.3 Literature Review 
The foreign policy of Lebanon is a mere reflection of its population and the 
country’s relation with regional and international powers. From this context 
and following the re-construction of the Lebanese state after the country’s 
fifteen years of civil war, significant amount of academic articles have been 
written about the country’s foreign policy. In fact, many scholars as well as 
politicians have posed the lack of a unified foreign policy in Lebanon as the 
main obstacle challenging the statehood of Lebanon. 
 For starters, the definition of foreign policy in itself, according to 
Flockhart, is an “agent-level activity” which encompasses several policy 
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makers subject to both internal and external environments
26
. These agents, 
according to constructivists, “do not have a portfolio of interests that they 
carry around independent of social context; instead they define their 
interests in the process of defining situations”27.  
This is not to say that constructivism ignores the national and material 
interests of actors. However, identities are placed at the core of interests and 
therefore, the foreign policy of a certain state is initially a product of socio-
cultural factors, in other words identities. From this perspective, Lebanon’s 
foreign policy requires in-depth analyses of the identities and sub-identities 
and the domestic level which are posing various challenges to the making of 
a united foreign policy.  In fact, Charbel Nahas, the former 
telecommunications and labor minister of Lebanon, published an article in 
Al-Akhbar newspaper stating that “foreign policy is the translation of 
internal choices and their extension into the state’s external relations”28. 
Ussama Makdisi, the author of the “Reconstructing the Nation-State: The 
Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon”, depicts sectarianism as a recent 
phenomenon in Lebanon dating back to the nineteenth century. Unlike 
popular beliefs, sectarian-based politics in Lebanon have not always 
existed; rather it has been deployed as a tool by the elites to maintain their 
influence by dividing the community along sectarian lines
29
. Makdisi gives 
the example of communities in Mount Lebanon which were, prior to the 
                                                          
26
 (Flockhart, 2012) 
27
 (Wendt, 1992) 
28
 “Lebanese Foreign Policy: The Foundation of an Actual State” an article written by Charbel Nahas 
which explores the limitations to the re-emergence of a Lebanese state with a unified foreign policy 
(Al-Akhbar, 2013, April 30) 
29
 (Makdisi U. , 1996) 
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nineteenth century, rooted in “hierarchical politics of notability that cut 
across religious lines”30.   
Bassel Salloukh elaborates on the role of sects and sub sects in inhibiting 
the making of a coherent Lebanese foreign policy in “The Art of the 
Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon”. He adds that alongside these 
domestic divisions, domestic actors ally themselves with external powers 
and employ “transnational ideologies” in order to consolidate their rule 
internally and these alliances permits external actors to interfere in 
Lebanon’s decision-making on a variety of issues 31 . Sam Khazai and 
William J. Hess examine, in their work “Enemy Brothers: Conflict, 
Cooperation, and Communal Dynamics within Lebanon”, the reaction of 
the seven major political factions in Lebanon to the Syrian crisis
32
. They 
also explore how each of these actors follow its independent foreign policy 
based on its interests which are dependent of their identities resulting in 
what Henrietta Wilkins refers to in her book “The Making of Lebanese 
Foreign Policy: Understanding the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war”, as 
multiple foreign policies
33
.  
As the Syrian uprising soon turned into a civil war, Lebanon opted for a 
policy of disassociation as expressed in terms of neutralization in the 
Baabda Declaration. However, Justin Salhani, an author at the Daily Star, 
highlighted in his article the failure of this policy as parties refused to 
impersonate the plan of disassociation
34
.  As such policy failed to translate 
into action, the problem of identities and their role in obstructing the 
                                                          
30
 (Makdisi U. , 1996) 
31
 (Salloukh B. , The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon, 2008) 
32
 (Khazai & Hess, 2013) 
33
 (Wilkins, 2013) 
34
 (Salhani, 2012) 
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creation of a cohesive Lebanese foreign policy resurfaced to gain once again 
the consideration of various intellectuals.  
1.4 Map of the Thesis  
This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter introduces the main 
parameters of the thesis. Chapter two provides a theoretical framework by 
introducing constructivism and its contribution to explaining foreign policy 
in general and that of Lebanon in particular.  Chapter three discusses the 
rise of sectarianism in Lebanon prior to independence and how it has been 
constructed and manipulated following independence. The chapter also 
examines the role that sectarianism played in the making of Lebanon’s 
foreign policy until the Syrian uprising in 2011. Chapter four explores the 
nature of the Lebanese political parties and the culture of the Zaiim. Chapter 
five explains the outbreak of the Syrian uprising and its development into a 
civil war and its implication on Lebanon and its foreign policy.  The Baabda 
Declaration serves as the case study to evaluate the overlapping 
disagreement over Lebanon’s foreign policy which will be elaborated in this 
chapter. The sixth and final chapter summarizes the main arguments of the 
thesis and concludes with an evaluation of constructivism’s strengths and 
limitations in explaining Lebanon’s foreign policy and the continuing 
constraints it faces.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Constructivism Overview 
The ending of the Cold War and the inability of the two most popular 
theories, being pluralism and realism, to foresee, let alone explain, its 
ending, paved the way to the emergence of a relatively new theoretical 
approach in international relations, that of constructivism
35
. “Constructivism 
can be seen as a middle ground or bridge between other conceptual 
approaches to international relations”36. In other words, Constructivism can 
be placed in the middle of a spectrum on which the positivist, in other word 
the realist and liberal approaches are found on one end and their antagonist 
or anti-positivists approaches such as poststructuralist are located on the 
other end. Actors’ behaviors to positivist theories are driven by “materially 
oriented interests” and ideas are of second importance37.  
One of their main assumptions is decisions are taken by rational actors who 
evaluate the pros and cons of each alternative before settling on a choice
38
. 
As for the other end of the spectrum, the emphasis is placed on the power of 
ideas and the importance of science is thus reduced
39
.  
Constructivism’s roots extend to other disciplines such as philosophy and 
sociology and can be traced back to the work of Giambattista Vico, an 
Italian philosopher in the eighteenth century. Vico distinguished between 
two worlds; a natural world created by God and a historical world fashioned 
                                                          
35
 (Flockhart, 2012, pp. 79-81) 
36
 (Viottil & Kauppi, 2012, p. 278) 
37
 (Viottil & Kauppi, 2012, p. 278) 
38
 (Viottil & Kauppi, 2012, p. 278) 
39
 (Viottil & Kauppi, 2012, p. 278) 
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by man
40
.  Additionally, Emmanuel Kant, the German philosopher, is 
another intellectual precursor to the rise of constructivism who argued that 
our knowledge of the world is a subjective understanding affected by our 
human consciousness
41
.  Other key scholars whose influences are directly 
revealed in the constructivists approach are John Locke, Emile Durkheim 
and Max Weber. Locke’s influence on constructivism is revealed in their 
assumptions regarding anarchy. At the domestic Level of analysis Locke 
claimed that society is established by a contract to bring together individuals 
and that an “anarchic state of nature” is not necessarily confrontational42.  
Constructivists applied these arguments in their analysis at the international 
level of analysis. In other words, the realist assumption of self-help in an 
insecure world lacking a legitimate central authority is not the only valid 
interpretation of the international system. Constructivists also were 
influenced by Durkheim’s argument that structure influences the relation 
between actors and this interaction has a causal effect
43
. Durkheim also 
claimed that ideational and material structures can be studied 
scientifically
44.  Last but not least, Weber’s contribution lies in his “idea 
that human actions can be value-driven- a value rationality in which choices 
follow from beliefs or commitments often rooted in moral, ethical, religious 
or cultural understandings” 45 .  The intellectual contribution of the 
previously mentioned scholars will become apparent in the examination of 
the major assumptions of constructivism.  
                                                          
40
 (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, p. 164) 
41
 (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, p. 164) 
42
 (Viottil & Kauppi, 2012, p. 280) 
43
 (Viottil & Kauppi, 2012, p. 281) 
44
 (Viottil & Kauppi, 2012, p. 281) 
45
 (Viottil & Kauppi, 2012, p. 281) 
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The word constructivism however was coined by Nicholas Onuf in the late 
80’s and with the contribution of Alexander Wendt and other scholars 
constructivism was established becoming an important approach in the 
discipline of international relations. Wendt, in his article “Anarchy is what 
states make of it: the social construction of power politics” published in 
1992, sought to challenge the neorealist assumption that the anarchic nature 
of the international system unavoidably lead to self-help
46
.  It is not 
anarchy, according to Wendt, but rather the interaction between states that 
shape a particular set of state identities and interests.   
To begin with, just as Vico distinguished between two worlds, 
constructivists have also separated the political and social world from that 
of nature. In fact, the social and political world does not simply exist in a 
vacuum; “it is not an external reality whose laws can be discovered by 
scientific research and explained by scientific theory as positivists and 
behaviouralists argue”47. Individual’s beliefs and ideas, therefore, determine 
the historical and social world. Constructivism places the emphasis on 
“normative or ideational structures” which are highly important when 
analyzing the behavior of states and individuals
48
. Flockhart mentions that 
“structures are often codified in formal rules and norms, which agents are 
socialized into following”49.  Rules, in this regard, can either be formal as in 
the case of written constitutions and agreements or informal as in the case of 
unquestionable norms followed by particular groups
50
.  
                                                          
46
 (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, p. 168) 
47
 (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, p. 164) 
48
 (Reus-Smit, 2009, p. 220) 
49
 (Flockhart, 2012, p. 84) 
50
 (Flockhart, 2012, p. 84) 
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However, this does not mean that material structures are of no importance. 
In fact, the physical structures construct the social world just as beliefs and 
ideas do. Jackson and Sorensen stated that “the international system of 
security and defense, for example, consists of territories, populations, 
weapons and other physical assets”51. However, they added that “it is the 
ideas and understandings according to which those assets are conceived, 
organized and used—e.g. in alliances, armed forces, etc.—that is most 
important” 52 . They added that the “physical element is there, but it is 
secondary to the intellectual element which infuses it with meaning, plans it, 
organizes it and guides it”53. Indeed, a center belief of constructivism “is 
that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the 
meanings that the objects have for them”54. The difference in state behavior, 
thus, is not solely determined by the balance of power in an anarchic 
international system, as realists, assume.  The reason that the U.S. behaves 
differently when tackling the nuclear power of Iran than when dealing with 
the nuclear power of Israel “depends on the intersubjective understandings 
and expectations, on the distribution of knowledge, that constitute their 
conceptions of self and other”55.  
In short, states do not behave similarly towards rivals as they do when 
dealing with allies because the former are intimidating while the latter are 
not
56
. Sovereignty, in this sense, “exists only in virtue of certain 
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intersubjective understandings and expectations”57. This term does not exist 
without the presence of an alternative.  Constructivism takes into 
consideration agents other than the state such as transnational and 
international organizations in their analysis of actors and perceives “the 
world as a project always under construction”58. Unlike realists who regard 
the state as a black box, constructivists look deeper into the components of 
the state and place an emphasis on the actions taken by individuals who 
constitute the state
59
.   
A core concept to constructivism is that of “inter-subjectivity”. In other 
words, “ideas must be widely shared to matter”60. Nevertheless, “they can 
be held by different groups, such as organizations, policymakers, social 
groups or society”61. Those who adhere to the constructivist’s approach 
believe that identities and states’ interests are not innate, rather they are 
constructed. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how “non-material 
structures” influence and shape actor’s identities62. In fact, actors, being 
state or non-state, carry more than a single identity, each shaped by specific 
social, historical, political, cultural factors and these identities, in their turn, 
determine the interests of actors
63
.  State institutions, in this regard, are 
indentified as an arrangement of interests and identities which are flexible 
and can be changed. These institutions can thus either be cooperative, 
conflicting or competitive
64
. To sum it up, constructivism is an empirical 
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approach focusing on shared ideas that characterize international affairs. 
Objective knowledge is a false notion according to this approach as our 
understanding of the truth is subject to our human consciousness.   
The contribution of constructivism to the international affairs discipline is 
significant especially when it comes to foreign policy analysis. By including 
the social element and explaining how these interests are constructed, 
constructivism added an important component to the analysis of a country’s 
foreign policy. The following section will delve deeper into the 
contributions of constructivism to the understanding and advancing of 
foreign policy. 
2.2 Constructivism and Foreign Policy Analysis 
Foreign policy denotes an arrangement “of official external relations 
conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations”65. It should neither be confused with public policy which defines 
a state’s actions within its boundaries nor should it be confound with 
diplomacy which represents one side of foreign policy
66
.  Foreign policy 
analysis, in this case, is the examinations of factors and motives that led the 
state to undergo a certain action. It also includes the decision-making 
process which led to this behavior as well as the outcome of that decision.   
Until the cold war, the two dominant views that explained state behavior 
were that of realism and liberalism. The main realist perspective, as stated 
by Kenneth Waltz was that state interests arise from objective factors linked 
to national security and international threats in an anarchic international 
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system
67
. State is perceived as a unitary actor constantly struggling for 
power. As for the liberalist theory, states as well as international institutions 
share commercial interests that along with the spread of democracy will 
lead to cooperation and peace
68
.   
As the cold war ended, intellectuals “engaged in foreign policy analysis 
(FPA) have forged new paths of inquiry essential to opening the black box 
of domestic politics and policymaking in an effort to understand actors' 
choices in global politics”69. Therefore, various levels of analysis influence 
foreign policy outcomes. The embracement of actors neglected by the two 
previously mentioned theories and the importance given to non-material 
factors allowed constructivists to engage in foreign policy analysis.   
Constructivism disagrees with the realist assumption that states are unitary 
actors and takes into consideration other actors. Therefore, a “constructivist 
student of foreign policy would thus be interested in analyzing not only the 
interest construction process of state-based actors and the impact of unit-
level factors on it, but also the influence of supranational bureaucracies and 
transnational units, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) on constituting the agential interests at 
the state-level foreign policy making”70. States, in this regard, are social 
actors who interact in a system constructed by ideas, rules, norms and 
material factors. Decision makers, according to constructivism, construct 
the social environment within which they carry out foreign policy in dealing 
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with other states. Human awareness and knowledge must be taken into 
consideration when dealing with international relations studies
71
.  
Foreign policy, according to this approach, is a tool that links states. 
Constructivism delves into foreign policy by focusing on the impact of ideas 
and the construction of interests and identities and by linking norms and 
identity changes at both the national and international levels. 
Constructivism claims that constructed identities are determinate to 
interstate relations
72
. It holds that identities and interests shift depending on 
historical factors and social changes
73
.  To elaborate, states create identities 
which in their turn determine national interest.  From this perspective, as 
“anarchy is what states make of it, the national interest is also what states 
make of it”74.  
To sum it up, state’s identities and interests are shaped by historical, 
cultural, and political factors. Therefore an analysis of a country’s foreign 
policy must include domestic and international factors. International politics 
is the social realm in which states interact and foreign policy makers’ 
understandings of this world depends on the meanings created in their 
domestic environment.  
Looking at the Middle East from a constructivist perspective, foreign policy 
identities and states’ interests are endogenous and found within the state 
system itself. Sub-identities (ethnic or sectarian) and supra-identities 
(Islamic Ummah or Arab Nationalism)
75
 in the Middle East compete and 
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challenge state identities. As a consequence, “ruling elites are caught 
between raison de la nation (Pan-Arabism) and raison d’état (sovereignty) 
in foreign policymaking”76. Therefore an analysis of the region’s foreign 
policy must combine top-down approaches to as well as bottom-up 
approaches taking into consideration “multiple roles and nested contexts 
that enable, constrain, and constitute the players and playing fields of 
foreign policymaking”77.  
Moving precisely to Lebanon, sub-state actors have taken advantage of the 
weak state which allowed them to possess their own interests and forge ties 
with external powers. This situation allowed for these sub-state identity 
groups to develop their own foreign policy even if it contradicts that of the 
government and to create policies serving their personal interest once they 
seize power.   
Politics in Lebanon has been divided into two levels; one consisting of 
democratic institutions such as the elected parliament which is at the 
forefront of the political arena and a second which is more influential yet 
less observable consisting of kinship and sectarian ties
78
. However, 
sectarianism has not always existed in Lebanese politics. Actually, 
sectarianism, according to Makdisi, is “a creation that dates back no further 
than the beginnings of the modern era”79. This is not to say that security 
dilemmas are not essential especially when analyzing foreign states 
relations with Lebanon as in the case of Syria and Israel as well as the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
state. Lebanese nationalism, on the other hand, refers to distinguishing Lebanon from its Arab 
entourage and considers Lebanese to be Phoenicians and not Arabs.  
76
 (Hinnebusch, Introduction: The analytical framework, 2002, p. 8) 
77
 (Garrison, 2003, p. 184) 
78
 (Hottinger, 1961, p. 127) 
79
 (Makdisi U. , 1996, p. 23) 
21 
 
security dilemma that exists among various Lebanese groups. “Sectarian 
power struggle has driven sects to seek foreign backing and support in order 
to balance against one another”80. 
However, just as security conflicts, domestic and ideological conflicts 
constitute an important factor in the study of Lebanon’s politics and thus the 
“strength of Constructivism is its ability to explain influences on 
international affairs that are not based on the balance of power between 
states, or military conflict”81.  
Additionally, the political system in Lebanon, referred to as consociational 
democracy, indicates a power-sharing system whereby various sectarian 
groups and individuals are represented
82
. Such system places the emphasis 
on the domestic level when analyzing its politics. The division of the 
Lebanese community along confessional lines has been highly reflected in 
its foreign policy, or rather lack of it. Yet, it should not be denied that 
foreign policy in Lebanon witnessed some bright spots during the Shehabist 
era. In fact, Shehab adopted a policy of neutrality when it comes to foreign 
affairs. By grasping the pluralistic feature of the Lebanese system and its 
environment, he shaped the country’s foreign policy as to become “friendly 
but not tied to Nasser’s United Arab Republic, and friendly but not tied to 
Washington and Paris”83. 
In short, Lebanon lacks a unified foreign policy and this has been revealed 
in the limitations to the National Pact and the Taif Accord previously which 
have been repeated when looking at the current challenges to the Baabda 
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Declaration; being the primacy of elites’ interests and alliances with 
regional or international forces over national well being. However, sectarian 
identities in Lebanon are not primordial and have been constructed due to 
historical and social changes. The following chapter explains how 
sectarianism was constructed in Lebanon and what role did it play in the 
making of the country’s foreign policy.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
SECTARIANISM AND FOREIGN POLICY 
IN LEBANON 
According to Clark and Salloukh, “constructivism assumes that ethnic 
identities are a product of material and political struggles in specific 
historical contexts”84. Such identities are perceived as the creation of the 
interaction between domestic and foreign factors, the former characterized 
by the behavior of the Lebanese and the latter linked to the balance of 
power among regional and international powers
85
. Class conflict and 
cleavages characterize societies in the industrialized world whereas racial, 
sectarian and ethnic differences marked societies in the developing world
86
. 
In Lebanon, class mobilization is possible; one can move from a certain 
“socio-economic class” however “particularistic affiliation, on the other 
hand, is rigid and ascriptive”87. One might find itself rejected from society 
should this person choose to move out of the group that the latter was born 
into. “Thus, one is born Arab, Druze, Shiite, Sephardic or Circassian and 
cannot opt out of the group with the same ease as one may marry into the 
upper class and, by doing so, espouse a different socio-economic class”88. 
What are the historical and social factors that led to the rise of sectarian 
identities in Lebanon and made such affiliations significantly rigid? 
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3.1 Prior to independence 
“Before the processes of sectarianisation, any number of identities could 
have been more powerful than those tied to religion”89. These identities 
could have ranged from a person’s social rank to one’s political opinion.  
The divisions in Mount Lebanon were little related to sectarian contentions 
and more linked to the hierarchy found in the “politics of notability” 
whereby the notables belonging to influential families controlled various 
territories within Mount Lebanon creating an elite class that cut across 
sectarian lines
90
. These “great families” were distinguished from the 
commoners also known as the “ahali” common people, by their acquisition 
of lands, their tenures and language and matrimonial bonds. Thus, beliefs 
“of a unified, territorially demarcated nationalism of adherents of a 
particular religion that transcended kin, village or region” 91 were lacking.  
 Prior to independence, one could not talk about a Lebanese foreign policy. 
However, with the approach of the nineteenth century, several changes 
paved the way to the rise of sectarianism in Lebanon. To begin with, the 
Christian population grew in size which shifted the balance in favor of the 
elites belonging to this sect as they constituted more than half of the 
population (55.6% in 1956)
92
. Prior to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 
European forces distinguished the Christian community by giving 
advantages to its traders and placing it under its wing under allegation of 
protecting it from its Muslim counterpart
93
.  
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In 1830s, the Ottoman Empire sought to grant equality before law to all 
inhabitants of its provinces; a process called “tanzimat”94. This and other 
reforms served to please European great powers; mainly France and Britain 
which took the role of the protectionist of Christian and Druze communities 
respectively. Adding to European interests, Ibrahim Pasha followed a 
strategy to quell any local discontent which is to pit a certain group over the 
other. In 1840s, the Druze rebelled against the Ottoman Empire and as a 
result Ibrahim Pasha mobilized the Maronites against them
95
.  “The civil 
war between Maronites and Druze in1860 and the massacres it caused at a 
time of a weakening Ottoman empire, intensified the political intervention 
of European powers”96. Undeniably, the intervention of French troops allied 
with Christian communities had culminated growing sectarian divide.  To 
be sure, a web of factors played a role in the process of sectarianisation such 
as colonialism. Deliberately or not, colonial forces played a stimulating role 
in the development of sectarianism in Lebanon
97
.   
The Ottoman Empire’s breakdown and the signing of the 1916 Sykes-Picot 
Agreement signaled the beginning of a new era; that of colonialism.  Indeed 
Sykes-Picot could be considered as the materialization of “colonial 
decisions permanently shaping (or misshaping) the Middle East, different 
regimes, both colonial and post-colonial have stimulated sectarianism for 
their own goals in terms of power”98. Adding to that, colonialism had a 
major impact on the exploitation of politics based on religion by elites. The 
“drive to create a territorially unified Lebanese nation- state was in part the 
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result of European (primarily but not exclusively French) colonial myth-
making”99.  
With the French mandate, the Maronite and Druze leaders sought to take 
advantage of the European penetration and the economic integration by 
playing the sectarian card in order to appeal to these powers and maintain 
their ruling position
100
. Thus, the sect and its security came to replace 
classes and social ranks and became a mobilizing card in the hands of the 
elites who manipulated it whenever their positions became jeopardized. The 
support of the Maronites with their strong ties with France led to the 
creation of Great Lebanon in 1920. Following this year, “the issue was no 
longer enshrining the taifa as a nation but forging a Lebanese nation-state 
composed of many taifas”101. The creation of Great Lebanon increased its 
territories and as a consequence it religious heterogeneity. The Maronites 
depicted themselves as the main leaders of Great Lebanon and referred to 
their demographic numbers and their alliance with the French to legitimize 
their claim. By that time, Sunnis became the largest Muslim community, 
outnumbering the Druze and Shiites, and rejected the idea of a Great 
Lebanon as they called for a Greater Syria
102
.  
To keep their control and face the threat of Arab nationalism and other 
independent movements, the French deliberately kept sectarian divisions as 
they adopted a divide-and-rule strategy. Even though colonial power took 
the role of protectionist of Lebanon autonomy and Christian interests, they 
kept the Maronites away from dominating all state institutions. In fact, the 
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“power-sharing policies of French officials left vulnerable to political 
sectarianism, feudalism and clientelism”103. Their policies resulted in the 
strengthening of the elites’ control as the latter portrayed themselves as the 
protectors of their communities’ interests and rights.  
Additionally, Syrian intervention in Lebanese affairs can be traced back to 
that era. The policies taken by the French colonial power against 
nationalists and those calling for a Greater Syria paved the way for Syria to 
interfere in Lebanon by manipulating sectarian divisions to undermine 
French power
104
.  The German invasion of France undermined the latter’s 
power in the Middle East. This marked the beginning of a new era in the 
region characterized by national movements and quest for independence. As 
for Lebanon, three nationalist movements could be distinguished in that 
period; “Christian Nationalist” who continued to seek for French protection, 
“Arab Nationalists” who called for Greater Syria and Lebanese Nationalist 
who sought for an independent Lebanon that encompassed the territories 
agreed upon in 1920 declaration of Great Lebanon and which hold close ties 
with its Arab surrounding
105
.    
3.2 Following Independence  
Lebanon’s foreign policy formally began when the country acquired its 
independence from French colonialism in 1943. Indeed, the “divergent 
conceptions of the identity of the state result in a collection of foreign 
policies that are held by various state, sub-state, and non-state actors”106. 
The relation of both its state and non-state actors with external powers 
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became determinant of the country’s foreign policy. In fact, understanding 
domestic politics in Lebanon is essential to fully comprehending the 
multiplicity of foreign policies of actors. Additionally, “external regional 
and international actors direct their policies not only at the Lebanese state, 
but also at these sub-state and non-state actors”107. Therefore, Lebanon’s 
foreign policy is described as a two-level game as it encompasses both 
domestic and foreign political affairs. 
As a result, actors contested over the control of the “Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Emigrants” as it became one of the mainly desired posts in the 
government. Prior to plunging into civil war, the National Pact; an informal 
agreement between the Maronite President and the Sunni Prime Minister, 
determined the country’s foreign policy. The latter sought to achieve a 
balance between the Christians’ wished to deepen their ties with the West 
and the Muslims’ desires to join the Arab world and Ummah.  
This power-sharing system also referred to as consociational democracy, 
comprised three major notions. The first principle is that of “segmental 
proportionality”, meaning that a community’s representation in the 
parliament reflect its demographic weight
108
. Thus, the Christian 
community had the largest representation in the parliament as the latter’s 
seats were divided among the two main sects based on a six to five ratio
109
. 
Maronites were also guaranteed the position of the head of General 
Directorate of General Security, “the army and military intelligence, the 
supreme justice council and central bank”110.  Additionally, until the time of 
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writing, the presidency is reserved to the Christian Maronites whereas the 
Sunnis and Shiites are granted the positions of the prime minister and the 
speaker of the parliament respectively.  
The second notion is that of “segmental autonomy” which allows each 
community the right to practice its religious beliefs, build its educational 
and social institutions without any state intervention
111
. To illustrate, the 
Article 8 of the 1926 Lebanese constitution which was also maintained in 
the constitution of 1943 granted confessional communities the right to build 
and manage their private schools leading to a lack of common curriculum in 
the Lebanese educational system
112
. The third notion is that of a neutral 
foreign policy. The National Pact was in fact “an agreement by the Sunnis 
not to seek union with Syria in return for a pledge by the Maronites not to 
steer the country towards the west”113.  
Previous to the outburst of the Lebanese civil war, the presidency, being the 
most authoritative post, influenced the decision-making of the main policies 
in Lebanon and precisely that of its foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, 
Articles 52, 53, 55 and 56 of the constitution gave the president the right to 
“appoint prime ministers, appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers, promulgate 
laws, dissolve parliament, and negotiate and ratify international treaties”114.   
The National Pact guaranteed that no group was powerful enough to take 
solitary control over the state’s identity or decision making in order to 
ensure harmony and stability in a multi-confessional society. As for the 
country’s foreign relations, policies were taken in reference to the wishes of 
                                                          
111
 (Zahar, 2005, p. 228) 
112
 (Farayha, 2009, p. 2) 
113
 (Zahar, 2005, p. 228) 
114
 (Salloukh B. F., 2013, p. 135) 
30 
 
both the Christian and the Muslim communities. Yet, the historical mistrust 
and conflict between the various Lebanese sects prevailed and whenever the 
desires of these two communities would contradict, violent erupted. Foreign 
policy disagreements caused major turmoil in the country as the events of 
late 50s and 60s.  
Moreover, the “rise of Nassir in Egypt and the spread of his pan-Arab, anti-
western ideology in the 1950s deeply divided Lebanese confessional 
politics, contributing to the first Civil War of 1958”. In 1956, Jamal Abdel 
Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal with the support of the Soviet 
Union. The decision infuriated Western powers mainly Britain, France, 
Israel and the U.S. and resulted in an attack on the Suez Canal by these 
powers. The Lebanese President Camille Chamoun came under pressure as 
he maintained diplomatic relations with the West. Adding insult to injury 
was Chamoun’s refusal to take part in the United Arab Republic which 
joined Egypt and Syria. As a result, an opposition was formed within 
Lebanon against Chamoun, mainly by the Muslim communities and 
escalated into a civil war which led Chamoun to ask for help from the 
United States
115
. 
The previously mentioned events as well as other foreign policy dilemmas 
highlighted the failures of the National Pact to build a national unity and 
identity. The “National Pact, itself a result of elite compromises, essentially 
legitimated a system of patronage and a division of spoils among the elites 
of the new nation-state, thus betraying the inability to locate a genuinely 
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national base”116.  The state in independent Lebanon failed to become the 
sole determinant of the country’s foreign policy as sub-state actors devised 
their own foreign policy and ties with external powers. Thus, Salloukh 
questioned on whether the students of Lebanon’s foreign policy should take 
into consideration the  foreign policy of “the president, the prime minister, 
the speaker of parliament, the foreign minister, the variable sectarian sub-
state actors, or all above the above?”117.   
 The quarrel in Lebanon culminated and as the life span of the National Pact 
ran out, civil war erupted.  The civil war was a translation of the frustration 
with the political system. Sectarian groups resorted to violence in order to 
either maintain their influence and power within the government or to shift 
the distribution of power to their advantage. Lebanon geographic location 
placed it at the heart of the Arab-Israeli quarrel and left the country 
vulnerable to external manipulation especially by Syria, Egypt, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. External and domestic actors became determinant of the 
making of a foreign policy in the weak state of Lebanon
118
.  
Sectarian politics culminated and sectarianism reached its zenith in Lebanon 
in 1975 with the eruption of a bloody civil war that lasted around 15 
years
119
. The rise of armed groups and militias who used sectarianism in 
their battle along with the signing of the Cairo Agreement by the Lebanese 
government in the end of the 60s which gave the Palestinian a legitimate 
right to armament in Lebanon reawakened the fear of marginalization 
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among several sects, mainly the Maronite community
120
. Such fear led to 
the dependency of various sects on foreign forces thus increasing the 
influence of non-Lebanese actors in the country’s affairs.  
On April 13, 1975, the head of the Phalange Party, Pierre Gemayel, 
attended a ritual ceremony at a new church in Ayn al-Rumana. This day 
would soon turn into a dark memory in the Lebanese History. During the 
ceremony, attackers opened fire at the participants leaving three Christians 
dead.  This happening infuriated the Christians in general and the Maronites 
in particular.  In their quest for revenge, a group of Maronite armed men 
ambushed a bus on which most passengers were Palestinians at Ayn al-
Rumana leaving twenty-seven dead and the rest wounded. This incident 
unleashed the beginning of the Lebanese civil war and became known as the 
catalyst that enflamed it
121
. The conflict “had a devastating impact on 
human, political, economic, and social levels” 122 . The war led to the 
breakdown of the state.  
With the intervention of Saudi Arabia, the United States and the blessings of 
Egypt, Syria, France, and Iran, the Taif Accord was signed and the 
Lebanese 15-years civil war was terminated
123
. This agreement reinforced 
the expired National Pact and gave Syria guardianship rights over Lebanon. 
New division of power was introduced; 20 seats were added to the 
parliament making their total 128 divided equally among Christians and 
Muslims while keeping on the same religious distribution of key positions 
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that prevailed under the pre-war pact
124
. The executive power, following the 
signing of Taif, shifted from the presidency to the cabinet; in other words 
from the Maronites to the Sunnis thus empowering the latter
125
. The Taif 
Accord revived the confessional system and power-sharing among religious 
communities. It only complicated the existing fears among the eighteen 
different sects as it relocated the power from the Presidency to the Council 
of Ministers thus “reducing the check and balance system between the three 
branches of government to a troika, a triangular relation between the 
President, Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament” which led to more 
deadlocks
126
. With the redistribution of parliamentary seats and high-raking 
governmental posts following a ratio of 5:5, and the transfer of power away 
from the presidency, the Christians felt marginalized and lost the advantages 
that they once gained under the French mandate and the 1926 constitution. 
Additionally, the “prerogatives and role of the Speaker, from the Shiite 
community, were strengthened and the Prime Minister was made 
accountable to parliament”127. As a result, the dissolving of the parliament 
by the cabinet became nearly unfeasible.   
Taif reflected clearly the Lebanese foreign policy that marked the beginning 
of the 90s until 2005; “it altered postwar foreign policymaking, and placed 
genuine constraints on the country’s foreign policy choices”128. The accord 
emphasized on the shared interests between Lebanon and Syria and the 
“distinct relations” that link them129 . Therefore coordinating on policies 
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became obligatory and an alibi to Syria’s intervention in the Lebanese 
affairs, especially in its foreign policy making.  
To sum it up, “selective implementation of the Taif Agreement has 
belied the essence of its stated objectives” 130 . “Arbitrary and partial 
application of reforms that have been initiated by Lebanese ruling 
elites under Syrian tutelage between 1990 and 2005 have in fact 
exacerbated confessional tension and competition, and have generated 
new imbalances in the post-war political system”131. 
3.3 The Syrian Era 
In November 1989, the Lebanese parliament endorsed and confirmed the 
signing of the Taif Accord. However, the violence did not end as a new 
cycle of fighting erupted but this time within the same sect; the Maronite 
community. General Michael Aoun and his supporter rejected the signing of 
the accord as it did not include a timeframe for Syria’s withdrawal from 
Lebanon
132
.   General Aoun’s rejection to leave the presidential palace 
ignited a new round of confrontation with Lebanese Forces militia headed 
by Samir Geagea.  However, the summer of 1990 brought with it the defeat 
of General Aoun and the actual realization of the Taif Accord.   
According to Salloukh, “Lebanon post-war transition was obfuscated by 
Syrian fiat” as “Damascus applied Taif whimsically”133.  
The reconstruction of the Lebanese state resulted in what Karam referred to 
as the “allotment state (Dawlat al-muhâsasa)” 134 . Leading ranks in the 
government and public bureaus are allocated to different sectarian 
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groups based on a fixed quota. The elite class in this era included two types; 
“warlords’ elite, resulting from the transformation and demobilisation of the 
militia system; and newcomers’ elite, following the arrival of reconstruction 
man and subsequently Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri”135 who “paved the 
way for other businesspeople and entrepreneurs to enter the world of 
politics”136. However, this class was more concerned with achieving its 
personal interests than with reconstructing state institutions. In fact, the 
distribution of lower-ranking posts as well as public and social services 
became dependent on sectarian affiliations and clientelism.  
The Taif Accord gave Syria a legal recognition to station its troops on 
Lebanese soils. Syria’s intelligence apparatus dominated state institutions 
and infiltrated the Lebanese social and political order. In order to avoid 
strong opposition in the long term, Damascus repressed those that were 
perceived as a threat to its existence in Lebanon. In its strategy to eliminate 
such resistance, Syria forced Michael Aoun into exile and sentenced Samir 
Geagea to jail based on charges including the assassination of Rachid 
Karameh, former Lebanese prime minister
137
. Yet, Syria did not face serious 
and effective confrontation within Lebanon and the situation remained 
unchanged and mostly secure till 2004
138
.   
Additionally, the three elections held in this era were manipulated and 
sought to bring to power those who maintain close relations with Syria. The 
Taif Accord also committed Lebanon to bilateral treaties giving Syria 
privileges in all fields especially in regard to the negotiations with Israel. 
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The “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination” signed in 1991 
stated in its first article that the “two states will work to achieve the highest 
levels of cooperation and coordination in all political and economic and 
security and cultural and scientific and other fields”139.  
Few months later, The Defense and Security Agreement was signed by both 
countries which included an accord to coordinate and cooperate between the 
security institutions with all their components of both countries.  It 
emphasized that Lebanon should not be a host to any anti-Syrian activity 
and the same applies to Syria
140
. This gave primacy to security issues and 
gave Syria a green light to interfere in Lebanon’s internal and external 
policies and making it the most influential regional player
141
. Thus, 
although the Taif Accord called for the disarmament of all militias, those 
who were allied to Syria kept their armaments. Therefore, Hezbollah was 
the only militia granted the right to keep its armaments as it served Syria’s 
geopolitical interest using the Israeli occupation of the Sheba Farms as a 
tool to legitimize its military presence
142
. 
In order to ensure that both countries abide by these treaties, a Lebanese-
Syrian Higher Council was created. However, the lack of balance between 
the powers of both countries meant that Lebanon would be at a 
disadvantage as those treaties serve the interests of Syria without taking into 
account those of Lebanon. The relations between the two countries became 
summarized in one sentence: “wahdat al-masarayn” in other words “the 
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coordination or unity of the two tracks” 143 . This underlined Syria’s 
dominance over Lebanon foreign policy decisions as the latter became 
prohibited from going into any form of negotiations or talks with Israel 
without referring to Syria foremost.  
Syria dominated the Lebanese political and social life in all its levels.  
Freedom of expression was banned, high censorship was exercised on the 
media and protests were harshly repressed. Sub-state actors to bandwagon 
with Syria in order to gain influence. Loyalty to Syria became the norm and 
constant visits were recorded by political leaders, pro or against Syria, to 
Damascus in order to maintain their existence back home. All these factors 
empowered Syria and gave it control over Lebanon’s foreign policy. This 
period saw a focus on economic reforms and reconstruction. 
Even when it comes to economic interests, Lebanon was linked to Syria. In 
1994, the Labor Accord was sealed between the governments of both 
countries. This agreement legitimized the entrance of Syrian workers and 
their penetration into the Lebanese market. The number of the Syrian 
workforce recorded entering Lebanon in the 1990s was approximately 
850,000 generating around US $1 billion in remittances to their home 
country
144
. Additionally, trade agreements and balance was more rewarding 
to Syrian than Lebanon. “Almost all profitable sectors of the post-war 
economy…were penetrated by Syrian officials, siphoning billions of dollars 
in personal profits” thus “the total Syrian revenues extracted from Lebanon 
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through licit or illicit activities in 1990-2005 amounted to some $20 
billion”145 
In short, foreign policy in postwar Lebanon became constrained by these 
“distinct relations” between Syria and Lebanon and manipulation of 
sectarian affiliations intensified.  
However, the regional and international setting following the 9/11 attacks 
and the Iraqi invasion in 2003 challenged Assad’s hegemony in Lebanon146. 
The Bush’s administration invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq through its war 
on terror signaled a strategy aiming at remodeling the regional landscape 
and reducing Assad’s power. In 2004, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's bloc 
along with its ally and the leader of the Druze Party, Walid Jumblat agreed 
on the promulgation of President Emile Lahoud for another term
147
. Few 
days later, a series of resignation of ministers took place and was followed 
by the resignation of the prime minster himself. Hariri along with his allies 
and his close ties with Saudi Arabia formed an opposition force which 
challenged the authority of the Syrian regime and its presence in 
Lebanon
148
.  
In 2005, Valentine’s Day took the last beat of Hariri’s and over 20 other 
citizens’ hearts as they were assassinated in a blast in the heart of Beirut149. 
Fingers were pointed at Syria, accusing it of being the main force behind the 
assassination. This stimulated a popular upheaval in Lebanon that cut across 
all sects and affiliation demanding the departure of Syrian military forces 
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and the resignation of the pro-Syrian government
150
. This became known as 
the Cedar Revolution.  
With UN Security Council Resolution 1595 and the withdrawal of Syrian 
troops from Lebanon in 2005, the country’s foreign policy became more 
complicated, albeit more independent, and underwent further challenges. 
With Syria’s withdrawal, foreign policymaking became a genuine battle 
between the two major political coalitions, pro and con Syria, in the country 
each made up of alliances of parties, supported by external actors and 
represented in the government.   
3.4 Post-Syria Lebanon 
“Political assassinations have been and remain an important (if secretive) 
feature of the foreign policies of states”151. Following Syria’s withdrawal, 
the Christians sought to restore the sectarian balance to their favor. Samir 
Geagea was released from prison and Michael Aoun returned to Lebanon 
from exile in France
152
. This development casted away the feeling of 
marginalization shared by many Christians in general and by mostly 
Maronites in particular
153
. Both Geagea and Aoun are leaders of the largest 
political parties in the Christian community. With blessings of the Maronite 
Patriarch, Christian politicians “demanded ultimate say in the election of a 
new president, a redistribution of bureaucratic positions to rectify what they 
described as a Muslim invasion of the bureaucracy since 1990, and a 
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reapportionment of posts throughout the state’s multiple security 
institutions”154. However, the electoral law selected in 2005 came at the 
disadvantage of the Christians creating a division in the political 
representation of the Maronites
155
.  
Following Hariri’s assassination,  tension among Sunni/Shiites grew in 
Lebanon as March-8 led by the Shiite Hezbollah allied with Iran and Syria 
faced an opposite camp, that of March 14 advanced by the Sunni Future 
Movement which bandwagoned with Saudi Arabia and the U.S to tilt the 
balance of power within the country to its own advantages
156
.  The newly 
elected parliament in 2005 signaled the victory of March 14 especially after 
the shift in the Lebanese political system which became dominated by the 
Sunnis under the Future Movement as was reflected in the new government 
formed following Hariri’s death.  
This led to the creation of a government led by Fouad Saniora and 
dominated by a Sunni majority, that being the Hariri Future Movement 
bloc
157
. “The elections resulted in de facto confessional cantonization, 
dividing the country into four tightly knit, closed, unipolar, sectarian 
communities: the Shia’a led by the Hezbollah-Amal alliance, the Sunnis by 
Sa’d al-Hariri, the Druze by Jumblat, and the Maronites led by Aoun and a 
bevy of less representative political leaders”158. Although the government 
received wide support from the West and Saudi Arabia, it remained 
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incapable of solving several political issues especially when taking the issue 
of Hezbollah’s disarmament.  
The deadlock brought to existence the National Dialogue in 2006. The 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established to inspect the murder of 
Hariri as it was labeled as a terrorist act with the encouragement of March 
14 whereas March 8 perceived it as invading Lebanon’s sovereignty and 
providing an excuse for external actors to interfere in the country’s internal 
affairs
159
. Although participants in the National Dialogue agreed on the 
disarmament of Palestinian groups they did not reach the same agreement 
on the issue of the Shiites militia’s weapons 160 .  The talks reached a 
stalemate in the summer of 2006. Fearing from political marginalization 
following Syria’s withdrawal, Hezbollah sought to assert its presence. 
Domestically and in an effort to balance against the influence of Saad 
Hariri, the son of Rafik Hariri and the leader of the Future Movement, 
Hassan Nasrallah signed “a memorandum of understanding with the most 
powerful Christian leader at the time, Michel Aoun, who had quickly fallen 
out with his March 14 partners following the 2005 elections”161.  
Regionally, Hezbollah reasserted its alliance with Syria and Iran by rallying 
its supporters on March 8 to a thank you Syria protest. When Hezbollah and 
Amal perceived their political status being challenged by March 14 in 
general and Hariri’s Future Movement in particular following the Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon, they resigned from the government. The 
government’s continued activity without the Shiite element outraged the 
supporters of Amal and Hezbollah and their allies. The result was a major 
                                                          
159
 (Bosco, 2009, p. 359) 
160
 (Schenker, Lebanese National Dialogue: Avoiding the Hard Questions?, 2006) 
161
 (Khazai & Hess, 2013, p. 29) 
42 
 
sit-in movement in Central Beirut calling for the stepping down of Sanioura 
and his government
162
.  
The summer of 2006 witnessed another Hezbollah-Israeli war. Hezbollah 
“attacked Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) across the internationally recognized 
borders, killed three and captured two of its soldiers”163 . The operation 
according to the group aimed at exchanging prisoners as Israel also had in 
detention members belonging to Hezbollah
164
. Israel responded by bombing 
various sites in Lebanon and thus Hezbollah reacted by launching missiles 
towards Israel. This conflict revealed that Hezbollah behaves independently 
of the state and conduct its own foreign policy.  In fact, “Hezbollah’s 
actions highlighted the Lebanese state’s inability to act as a single, unitary, 
rational and quasi sovereign actor and to control decision of war and peace 
over its territory”165.  
Although the government condemned the Israeli attacks on Lebanon, it also 
did not side with Hezbollah
166
.  The war re-emphasized the influence of 
sub-state identities over national ones and highlighted the foreign policy 
conducted by sub-state actors such as Hezbollah without taking into 
consideration the foreign policy of the state.  
In May 2008, the government decided to disconnect a telecommunications 
system operated by Hezbollah. The latter’s response came through its 
invasion of streets in Beirut in which a majority of Sunni resides
167
. To 
avoid another slip into violence or another civil war, Qatar’s capital re-
                                                          
162
 (Salloukh B. F., 2013, p. 144) 
163
 (Tür, 2007, p. 115) 
164
 (Tür, 2007, p. 113) 
165
 (Wilkins, 2013, p. 93) 
166
 (Wilkins, 2013, p. 101) 
167
 (Asfura-Heim & Steinitz, 2014) 
43 
 
united different Lebanese political factions, based on the calls of the 
country’s Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. The outcome saw the 
birth of the Doha Agreement that “called for the election of a consensus 
president, General Michel Suleiman, revised the country’s electoral 
formula, revived its parliament and other state institutions and gave 
Hezbollah veto power over the new national government”168. Although the 
accord ended an 18-months long stalemate in the country, it failed to 
prevent future deadlocks which have been reflected in the numerous rounds 
of National Dialogue which have taken place since 2006 without bearing 
any fruitful outcome. Both camps that emerged following February 14, 
2005 “Both sides struggled to pursue their interests on how to advance their 
agendas, while foreign actors sought to utilize the divide to best achieve 
their goals in the region”169.  
At the regional and international level, although Syria’s option to directly 
intervene in Lebanon through its troops was no longer at the table, it 
remained able to influence Lebanon’s domestic affairs greatly following its 
withdrawal by taking advantage of the system’s weakness in Lebanon. It 
exploited the internal divide by supporting March 8 and precisely Hezbollah 
using the latter as a pressure card to balance March 14 threat internally and 
the Israeli threat externally
170
. Moreover, Syria was accused of carrying out 
a series of bombings around Beirut and assassinations targeting March 14 
and anti-Syrian figures to further destabilize the country. Meanwhile, Iran 
continued to directly support Hezbollah as a strategy to deter Saudi’s 
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influence in the region on a political level and to create a significant Shiite 
alliance in a region dominated by Sunnis on the regional level
171
.   
Additionally, the “assassination of Rafik Hariri served as the critical 
rallying point through which regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia and 
the United States, could further pressure Syria to acquiesce to their vision of 
the regional order”172. In this regards, both the United States and Saudi 
Arabia supported anti-Syrian parties and perceived March 14 as an 
opportunity to weaken Syria’s power in the country and the region and as a 
chance to intervene in the country’s internal affairs.   
From the National Pact to the Taif Accord, Lebanon’s foreign policy has 
been highly vulnerable to domestic rivalries and penetrated by external 
players. With the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 2011, the risk of the 
conflict spilling across the border increased and sectarian tension mounted.  
As the outbreak of peaceful protests demanding the departure of Assad in 
Syria soon turned into a bloody civil war, Lebanon adopted a policy of 
“disassociation” and thus the Baabda Declaration, came to assert an accord 
between Lebanon’s two major coalitions and demanded “keeping Lebanon 
away from the policy of regional and international conflicts and sparing it 
the negative repercussions of regional tensions and crises”173. Undeniably, 
this statement does not apply to Lebanon’s policy towards Israel with which 
Lebanon is at state of war. However, the responses of the country’s political 
parties and figures varied ranged a spectrum either backing or opposing to 
the regime in Syria. Thus, Lebanon’s foreign relations became a tool used 
by elites at the domestic level and foreign actors at the regional and 
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international realm and sectarianism has been exploited by these players to 
justify alliances.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ZAIIM CULTURE AND THE 
LEBANESE POLITICAL PARTIES 
 “In pluralistic societies, patronage is often a common feature of the 
political process; the promotion of the interests of a particular sect is 
frequently widespread”174 . In Lebanon, the confessional political system 
establishes clientelism whereby political and sectarian leaders control the 
masses. Clientelism is a dyadic relationship between a patron and client. In 
other words, the patron owns certain resources that are vital to the clients. 
These resources vary from materialistic such as money, employments and 
other services or non-materialistic as security and protection. In order to 
have access to these resources, the client has to give something in return 
such as his work or his allegiance and loyalty
175
. Patronage is a form of 
clientelistic relations patronage defined as “the practice of using state 
resources to provide jobs and services”176. 
As the state weakens; the degree of patronage increases. Therefore, 
clientelism and patronage are characteristics of weak states such as 
Lebanon. In order to unpack Lebanon’s complexity, the following section 
will explore the development of the Zaiim culture and describe briefly the 
most influential political parties in post-war Lebanon and their impact on 
Lebanon’s foreign policy.  
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4.1 The Zaiim Culture 
Political patrons in Lebanon are known as the Zu’ama. A Zaiim “is a 
political leader and rather than being exclusively an officeholder, he may be 
a power broker with the ability to manipulate elections and the officials he 
helps elect”177. As a result, and in the nonexistence of a strong state and the 
rule of law, brokerage or “wasta” prevails. The citizen, for instance, will 
resort to the Zaiim in order to find an employment which eradicates the 
concept of meritocracy.   
Even prior to gaining independence, patron-client relationship have 
developed in Lebanon. It could be traced back to the Ottoman era during 
which some families in Lebanon became labeled as Zu’ama for being tax 
collectors or feudal lords
178
. Clientelism developed as landlords would 
allow peasants along with their families to use lands in return for infinite 
loyalty.  
The culture of the Zaiim persisted despite the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. “The representatives in Lebanon’s first parliament in 1943 all 
emanated from a specific class of powerful clan leaders, which existed in 
the community, the zu’ama’” 179 . The latter became described as the 
representative of its community speaking on their behalf and forwarding 
their interests. The Zaiim will also connect its community “to the outside 
world, meaning the Ottomans, the Europeans, and since 1943, to the 
Lebanese state”180.  
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In modern Lebanon, the political leader, or Zaiim came to replace the feudal 
lord, the peasants became the masses and services instead of lands are the 
resources provided by the Zaiim in exchange for loyalty
181
. In order to 
remain in power, Lebanese leaders resort to clientelism as well as electoral 
and non-electoral strategies. During election periods, politicians refer to 
“competitive clientelism” whereby these leaders compete in order to gain 
access to state resources which will be distributed, at a later stage, to their 
clients
182. “Fundamentally, people vote for candidates whom they believe 
they can deliver those services to them”183. 
Electoral considerations and increasing the number of voters are not the 
only reason to why sectarian leaders resort to clientelism. Longer-term and 
non-electoral incentives are highly important to various political groups in 
Lebanon. These non-electoral strategies comprise both peaceful and violent 
repertoires such as organizing demonstration or building barricades and 
resorting to armed confrontations respectively.  
The Zaiim in Lebanon seeks to have the ability to mobilize its supporters in 
large numbers in order to increase its influence in the government and on 
the political level.  The services offered by the Zaiim renders the citizens 
vulnerable to manipulation and unable to hold their leaders accountable 
fearing that they might lose their access to these services. Additionally, each 
sectarian community in Lebanon has one or more Zaiim which is perceived 
as the protector of the sect and therefore unquestionable loyalty is in order 
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to this Zaiim. “The position of Zaiim is frequently hereditary, and politics is 
often treated like a family business”184.  
According to Albert Hourani, three types of Zu’ama exist in Lebanon; the 
“feudal” Zaiim gains his popularity for being a landowner who descends 
from a family which held a rank in power traditionally. Such type is found 
mainly in regions where owning a sizeable estate is of high importance 
especially among the Sunnis in Akkar and the Shiites in Bekaa and also 
among the Druze community
185
. People resort to these Zu’ama mainly for 
protection and services. For instance, Walid Jumblat, the leader of the 
Progressive Socialist Party, belongs to this category as he inherited his 
political status from his father and he comes from a feudal family who had 
been the man leader of the Druze community in Mount Lebanon. The Solh 
family also had four of its members elected as Prime ministers. 
The second type is the “populist” Zaiim. Leaders belonging to this category 
rule over their subject by the virtue of providing services and protection on 
one hand and by adopting a certain ideology on the other hand
186
.  This 
category of Zu’ama is widespread mainly among the Maronite community 
and among Christian families, like Gemayel, Chamoun, Eddé and Frangieh.  
The third type is the “urban” Zu’ama which prevails mostly among Muslim 
urban leaders. These leaders gain their popularity, just as the previous type, 
by offering protection and adopting an ideology.  However, adding to these 
two sources, these Zu’ama resort to power and mobilize the masses with the 
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assistance of “strong arm men” also known as “the qabaday’s”187. Families, 
mostly Sunnis in Urban cities like Karameh from Tripoli fit in this type. 
Following the Civil War, other families and sectarian figures have 
penetrated the scene and acquired the title of Zu’ama without being related 
to a previous leader. The majority of these newcomers do not descend from 
notable families however they are following the same path of the traditional 
Zu’ama. These are either warlords such as Nabih Berri, head of Amal 
Movement and the Speaker of the Lebanese parliament, Michael Aoun, 
head of the Free Patriotic Movement, Samir Geagea leader of the Lebanese 
Forces or local Zu’ama whose popularity grew after certain events. For 
instance Suleiman Frangieh, the leader of the Marada, gained his support in 
his region Zgharta following the assassination of his father and the same 
applies to Omar Karameh whose followers in Tripoli increased after the 
assassination of his brother Rachid.  
The new Zu'ama played on the “confessional sentiment” of their subjects 
and “also tended to provide patronage, which was more bureaucratic than 
feudal in nature”188. In order to maintain and increase their popularity, it 
became necessary for the Zu'ama to attain power through elections in order 
to have access to governmental patronage. Whether inherited or not, most of 
these leaders became in control of the most influential parties in post-war 
Lebanon. Therefore, political parties in Lebanon do not share the 
characteristics of political parties found in Western democracies.  
However, not all leaders became in charge of political parties. In fact, not all 
Zu’ama have or had political parties but they were highly influential within 
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their groups and also had external relations. For example, Michel Mur, a 
Lebanese politician and former interior minister who had an influence 
within the Metn district and shared close relations with the Syrian regime 
during the 90s. Another example is former Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, 
also known for his pro-Syrian allegiance and his significant influence in 
Tripoli who until 2004 had no political party. Even late Emir Majid Arslan 
and his son Talal possessed a remarkable popularity among the Druze in 
Mount Lebanon and had no political party until 2001 during which Emir 
Talal established the Lebanese Democratic Political Party. Moreover, 
Zu’ama of tribes, such as the Ja’fars, for instance kept their loyalty to the 
tribe and maintained their autonomy by keeping their army.  
Despite this, the majority of Zu’ama in the country organized and took 
charge of political parties in order to maintain their existence and influence 
within their community and expend their authority. In fact, “the stability of 
these parties’ ideological platforms was minimal in comparison with the 
influence of individual party leaders”189. The policies and agendas of these 
parties became reduced to serve the interest of the Zaiim. Therefore, “the 
orientation of parties largely conformed to the outlook of their leader, rather 
than the other way around” 190 . They have also kept their foreign 
connections which have contributed to their “Zu’ama legitimacy” and 
empowered them vis-à-vis other groups and Zu’ama in the country. For 
instance, Hariri’s close relation with Saudi Arabia and the West aimed at 
deterring the influence of Nasrallah who is supported by Iran and Syria. 
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Therefore, in order to understand Lebanon’s complexity, the next section 
will describe the most prominent political parties in the country and their 
importance to identity formation.  
4.2 Lebanese Political Parties 
“Political parties have been active in Lebanon ever since the state was 
formed in the early 1920s”191. One thing these parties share in common is 
that they are headed by a Zaiim.  
Prior to 1975, parties, with various political and ideological affiliations and 
supported by outside powers, competed to increase the number of their 
supporters and to influence the decision-making process. All through the 
civil war, several parties took on an armed apparatus and militias became 
the parties that reigned over the different regions of the country. As the war 
ended, most parties became a mere reflection of the sectarian system 
describing themselves as the protectors’ of the sect which they represent.    
“Lebanese parties often have had no ideology, have devised no programs, 
and have made little effort at transcending sectarian support; in fact, despite 
their claims, most parties have been thinly disguised political machines for a 
particular confession or, more often, a specific zaim” 192 .  To be sure, 
ideological groups proliferated in Lebanon during the heyday of the Arab-
Israeli conflict in the 60s. These parties such as the Progressive Socialist 
Party, the Syrian Nationalist Party, the Ba’ath Party, Nasserite Party, and 
Lebanese Communist Party took the Palestinian issue as their main cause 
around which they gathered support. However, most parties in Lebanon, 
precisely following the civil war, have taken a sectarian form and became 
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divided into two factions made up of coalition of political parties; March 14 
and March 8 anti and pro-Syria respectively.  
An analysis of Lebanon’s political parties requires referring to the sectarian 
community to which it belongs as well as to the regional context in which it 
is situated. For instance, Shiites are a majority in Lebanon however they are 
a minority in an Arab World dominated by Sunnis.  “This regional-domestic 
dynamic, like many aspects of Lebanon’s political identity, plays into a two-
level game where internal concerns cannot be divorced from external 
competition” 193 . Therefore, the study of the security dilemma is as 
important as that of identity in understanding the alliances of domestic 
actors with regional and international forces.  
A quick pose is necessary in order to better understand the system of 
alliance of domestic groups with foreign actors. Lebanese political parties, 
especially since the seventies sought the protection of foreign actors as the 
conflict deepened between Muslims and the Palestinians on one hand and 
the Christians on the other. Thus Sunnis sought the protection of the Arab 
State mainly Egypt and Syria whereas the Maronites mainly the Phalangists 
sought the protection of Israel
194
.  
As the war approached its ending, the “inter-sectarian” conflict turned into 
an “intra-sectarian” one during which Christians as well as Muslims fought 
among themselves. As the war ended, the domestic alliance became a 
reflection of the regional and international conflict which saw the struggle 
between US and Saudi Arabia on one hand and Syria-Iran on the other. 
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Thus two main camps emerged in post-Syria Lebanon; pro-Syria March 8 
and pro-West March 14.  
With the Syrian uprising and the escalation of the Sunni-Shiites divide in 
the region, the alliances in Lebanon are becoming more sectarian-based. In 
fact, the focus is now less on March 14 or March 8 and more stressed on 
Hezbollah and Iran against the Sunnis and Saudi Arabia as well as against 
radicalists.  
In sum, decision-makers and political parties are in constant need to 
preserve their existence and rule and thus they are in need of foreign 
alliance. Confessional as well as other types of alliances and the 
bandwagoning and balancing tactics used by groups aim at having the upper 
hand in the country vis-à-vis other groups. The following section explores 
the main parties in Lebanon.  
4.2.1 Hezbollah  
Hezbollah emerged following the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982 and 
shaped a profile two years later
195
. It constructed a religious identity and as 
the war unfolded in the 80s, the militia was preoccupied in building 
“efficient institutions, including an array of public services, such as clinics 
and construction companies, while Amal
196
 offered its members a familiar 
patronage system” 197 . Thus, Hezbollah gained a significant popularity 
among the Shiite community and became recognized as a powerful actor in 
Lebanon. Theologically, Hezbollah follows the same stance of Iran's 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Thus the party’s ideology follows the doctrine of 
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Wilayat Al-Faqih, meaning that the government should be headed by a 
Shiite cleric. Over the years, the constructed religious identity of the party 
weakened as its constructed resistance identity took priority. In fact, the 
slogan of the party as an “Islamic Revolution in Lebanon” switched to 
“Islamic Resistance in Lebanon”198. Thus Hezbollah’s main goal was to 
resist the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territories. Although the 1989 Taif 
Accord ended the Lebanese civil war and called for the disarmament of 
armed factions in Lebanon, Hezbollah was the only militia allowed 
preserving its armaments due to its close alliance with Syria. “This situation 
implied a de facto recognition of Hezbollah’s role as the guardian of 
Lebanese sovereignty vis-à-vis the occupying force”199.  
With the withdrawal of the Israelis from Lebanon in 2000, the Syrian 
regime sought to preserve the existing of Hezbollah in order to serve the 
regime as well as Iran’s interest and to keep pressure on Israel. Thus, along 
with the Palestinian card, Hezbollah was given a new cause to its existence, 
that of liberating the Shabaa Farms
200
. The legal status of the farms however 
remains obscure. In fact, according to the maps of the UN and as claimed by 
the Syrian regime, the farms fall within Syrian territories
201
. Yet, Syria kept 
on verbally supporting Lebanon’s allegation of its entitlement of these 
farms
202
.  Hezbollah also increased its role in Lebanese politics by 
participating in elections and taking part in the government. Hezbollah “was 
officially regarded as a legitimate and protected ‘resistance’ group and 
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therefore, unlike other armed groups, entitled to carry arms as long as the 
state of war with Israel persisted”203. 
Hezbollah’s military apparatus and constant struggle with Israel as well as 
its anti-American position increased its importance at the international level. 
During the Cedar Revolution following the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 
2005, Hassan Nasrallah, the current leader of Hezbollah, mobilized it 
supporters in a thank you Syria demonstration on March 8. In 2006, 
Hezbollah plans an attack on Israeli soldiers beyond the Lebanese borders. 
As a response to the killing and kidnapping of its soldiers, Israel went into 
war with the party. “The 2006 Hezbollah war with Israel is a typical 
example of how Hezbollah used it popular support to present itself as a 
quasi legitimate institution that is capable to stand up against foreign 
aggression/occupation” 204 . This re-emphasized Hezbollah’s resistance 
identity. From this perspective, “the elimination of Hizbullah, and thus of 
the very idea of resistance, can be seen not just as a material objective but 
also as an ideational one on which Israeli domination and US hegemonic 
stability in the region depends”205. 
In 2011, the Syrian uprising began and it soon escalated into a civil war. 
Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict highlighted once again the 
religious identity of the group as a protector of the Shiites’ security, its 
political identity as an ally to the Assad’s regime and its ideational/material 
objective as a contender to the Israeli’s presence. The role of Hezbollah in 
the Syrian war will be further developed in chapter four. Yet, Hezbollah’s 
participation in the Syrian conflict underlined its capacity to conduct its own 
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pro-Iranian foreign policy irrespective of the Lebanese government’s 
disassociation position from the Syrian conflict. 
Adding to its religious, resistant and political identity, Hezbollah also 
developed a social identity. With Iranian financial support, Hezbollah’s role 
in various Lebanese regions, particularly those in which most inhabitants 
belong to the Shiite community, undermined the position of the state 
towards its citizens. To illustrate, regions in the southern suburbs of Beirut 
and the Bekaa Valley have suffered from poverty and poor infrastructure, in 
other words they have suffered from the absence of the state
206
.  Hezbollah 
took on the role of the state in these regions Hezbollah and “built an 
extended network of welfare and social services” 207 . These services 
enhanced the image of the party among its community as well as other sects 
residing in regions to which these services extended. The religious, 
resistance, political and social identities as well as the ability to conduct of 
its own foreign policies, allowed Hezbollah to perform “as a state within a 
state”. 
4.2.2 Amal Movement 
“Amal movement was established in 1975 by Imam Musa as Sadr, an 
Iranian-born Shia cleric of Lebanese ancestry who had founded the Higher 
Shia Islamic Council in 1969”208. Amal (meaning hope) was the military 
wing of the “Movement of the Disinherited” which was also created by Sadr 
to press forward the Shiite rights in Lebanon
209
. The decision of Sadr not to 
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engage this militia in the 1975 civil war and its support to Syria’s 
intervention in Lebanon in late 70s weakened its popularity.   
In 1978, Sadr disappeared in Libya turning him into a religious symbol. 
Thus, Amal constructed and developed a religious identity revolving around 
Sadr. Additionally, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 empowered the Shiites in 
the Arab World especially in Lebanon and with the PLO attacking Amal, 
the number of the Shiites supporters to the party increased significantly. 
“By the early 1980s, Amal was the most powerful organization within the 
Shia community and perhaps was the largest organization in the country”210. 
The movement is currently headed by Nabih Berri and its ideology centers 
around supporting the Palestinian cause, resisting Israel. Amal is pro-Syrian 
and pro-Iran.  
Divisions within the “Shi’a elite –empowered by the success of the Iranian 
Revolution and more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause- led to a schism 
in Amal with the result of the founding of Hezbollah”211. As a result, violent 
quarrel occurred between Hezbollah and Amal as each group sought 
leadership of the Shiite community and domination over the South
212
. The 
triumph of Hezbollah diminished the power of Amal in various regions 
resided by Shiites mostly, notably in Beirut’s suburbs 213 . Nevertheless, 
Hezbollah and Amal reached an agreement in 1991 in which “Amal 
movement was offered Shiite representation in the government, and 
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Hezbollah the monopoly of resistance against the Israelis in South 
Lebanon”214.  
Currently, both parties belong to the same coalition and they forged 
alliances during elections such as those in 2005 which resulted in “a 
rapprochement between both organizations” 215 . Although Amal and 
Hezbollah agree on many ideational objectives such as allying with Syria, 
resisting Israel and representing the Shiites, differences between both 
parties on various issues are as highly important in understanding the 
continuing cleavages between them. To begin with, unlike Hezbollah’s pan-
Islamic ideology and religious identity, Amal movement shares a pan-
Arabism ideology and a less religious identity
216
.  
Additionally, Amal remains distant from Iran and more closely tied with 
Syria
217
. Amal was initially a social protest movement and not a militia as 
Al-Sadr “wanted to be seen as a figure that utilized state institutions for 
reform, or one “working within the system,” and wanted Amal to be seen as 
such”218.  Amal has sought to maintain its ties with the Syrian regime over 
the years and play the role of mediator between the Syrian regime and those 
who oppose to it in Lebanon. However, with the outbreak of the Syrian 
uprising, Amal found itself in an uncomfortable position. Although the 
party has publically announced its support to the Assad regime, the 
movement is seeking a channel through which it can remain in power and 
maintain its relations vis-à-vis many political groups in the county. “Berri’s 
priority is protection of the Shia community, however, he understands that 
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he must continue to work within Lebanon’s political establishment to 
achieve that goal, and he seeks to minimize the spillover of the conflict into 
Lebanon”219.  
It is worth mentioning that Amal Movement, just as Hezbollah, plays a role 
in providing social services and welfare mainly to the Shiites. However, 
unlike Hezbollah which developed its own welfare institutions, Amal relied 
on “state patronage for its social initiatives” such as establishing schools 
and running “health clinics, at least two of which were run in cooperation 
with the Ministry of Public Health and Ministry of Social Affairs”220.  
4.2.3 The Free Patriotic Movement 
  The Movement was established in early 90s by Michael Aoun, a former 
prime minister and Lebanese army commander. Aoun was sent to exile for 
rejecting the Taif Accord and the deployment of Syrian troops in the 
country and led the movement from Paris. He returned to his homeland 
following the departure of the Syrian army in 2005. Aoun participated in the 
Cedar Revolution. The party first developed a secular identity with an 
ideational objective to resist Syria’s tutelage over Lebanon. However, its 
stances against the Taif Accord with its diminution of the Christians 
privileges increased the party’s popularity among Christians. The movement 
gained the majority of the Christian parliamentarian seats in 2005 and had 
the second largest coalition in the Lebanese parliament.  
The result of the 2005 elections restored Aoun’s image as a guardian of the 
Maronite. However, “March 14 coalition rejected Aoun’s bid to become 
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president, and in fact, offered him no government post”221.  Fearing from 
marginalization, Aoun shifted his alliance and following the signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah, his movement became 
considered within March 8 coalitions. Although Aoun claimed that his 
alliance with the pro-Syrian coalition strives towards national unity, Aoun’s 
main aim was to secure a road to presidency and balance along with 
Hezbollah the ascending power of the Sunnis headed by the Future 
movement. Even though the party is non-sectarian and follows a secular 
ideology, the majority of its members belong to the Maronite community. 
The memorandum signed with Hezbollah called for the drafting of a new 
electoral law and insisted on dialogue as the sole mean to resolve conflict
222
. 
The memorandum also defended Hezbollah’s right to keep its arms as long 
as Israel continues to occupy the Shabaa Farms
223
.  
Ever since, Aoun’s statement came to defend Hezbollah and this has been 
reveled in his position regarding Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian 
conflict. Aoun’s “decision was influenced by a fear of being politically 
isolated and a desire to balance with other factions”224. This comes as a 
limitation to constructivism which will be developed further in the final 
chapter. The party claimed that its response to the Syrian conflict came not 
to support the Assad regime in particular but to warn against the fall of 
Assad as it will bring extremists to power in Syria and thus put an end to 
pluralism in both Syria and Lebanon
225
. “Perhaps, as Lebanon’s only major 
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politician who has resisted significant external patronage, Aoun has 
nowhere to turn but within Lebanon itself”226. 
4.2.4 Progressive Socialist Party 
The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) “was founded in 1949 by members of 
various sects who were proponents of social reform and progressive 
change” 227 . The party became highly popular under the rule of Kamal 
Jumblat, who became considered as a Zaiim to the Druze community.  
Jumblat called for a secular democracy and opposed the “confessional 
system, largely because the structural division of power excluded members 
of the Druze community- as well as other minority confessional group from 
holding any of the major political posts in the Lebanese government”228. 
 Although it started off as a non-sectarian party developing a secular 
identity, it took on a confessional apparatus especially following Jumblat’s 
assassination and the inheritance of the party’s leadership by his son Walid. 
Over the years the PSP has been highly known for its shifting alliances and 
policies. Its philosophy goes against armed confrontations however the 
party took part in Lebanon’s civil war of 1958 and 1975.  
In 1952, Camille Chamoun became the new president of Lebanon. His 
desires to associate closely with the West, precisely with the United States 
under President Eisenhower who sought to limit Nasser’s influence and to 
increase the presidential power infuriated the Lebanese Muslims. 
Regionally, Arab Nationalism was expanding under Nasser. Additionally, 
Chamoun’s “attempted to seek reelection by means of a constitutional 
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amendment”229. The government thus sought to reallocate “the electoral 
districts in such a way that they cut across the boundaries of the traditional 
regional and religious territories of certain zu'ama”230. Thus, Jumblat for 
example would have to compete “in a district only partly Druze and partly 
Christian”231. This led to an anti-Chamoun coalition in which Jumblat was 
highly influential. Adding to that, Jumblatt opposed the “Eisenhower 
Doctrine” supported by Chamoun which sought to reduce Nasser’s 
influence and he rejected any attach on Egypt and Nasser whom with he 
shared close alliance
232
.  
Portraying itself as a guardian of the underprivileged, Jumblat allied himself 
and his party with the Palestinians during the civil war of 1975 which led to 
an armed conflict against the Phalange militia and the Lebanese Army in the 
1983 in Mount Lebanon. It should be mentioned that the Druze community 
was headed by both the Jumblat family and the Yazbak kin headed by Majid 
Arslan. These events led to the perishing of the party’s secular face and the 
construction of a religious identity revolving around the leadership of a 
Zaiim, in this case Jumblat who became the protector of the Druze 
community.   
Since late 80s, Walid Jumblat has gathered the support of the majority of 
the Druze community. Its shifting position toward Syria has not affected the 
party’s popularity. Jumblat took part in the Cedar Revolution and became 
known for his anti-Syrian position within the March 14 alliance. Yet, in 
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2009, Jumblat took a decision to leave the March 14 coalition
233
. This 
statement came as no shock for as “Jumblat is known as a maverick that 
will move however the winds change”234. Jumblat expressed his willingness 
to enhance his relations with the Syrian regime describing his anti-Syrian 
statements as sins
235
.  The PSP leader constantly seek to remain one step 
ahead on all changes and to be on the right side of the history once these 
changes take place in “order to stave off political insignificance for himself 
and the Druze community”236. These shifting alliances of Jumblat can be 
described as ones driven by necessity; but the necessities are not always 
materialistic. Although the alliance with March 14 gave Jumblat electoral 
advantages, yet the latter’s “obligation was to the Druze sect, and he would 
shift alliances in a flash to advance Druze interests” 237 . Thus, the 
calculations and strategy of Jumblat are not solely driven by material 
reasons, but also by ideational and sectarian ones. 
Regarding the Syrian uprising, Jumblat’s response echoed his desire to 
safeguard the interest of the Druze. From this perspective, Jumblat is 
carefully crafting his words and statements in order to reduce the number of 
his foes in case Lebanon plunged into violence
238
.  
4.2.5 The Phalange Party  
Founded in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel, the Phalange Party or Kataib was 
characterized by its strong leadership and high centralization. It developed 
into a key Maronite power in Mount Lebanon and thus acquired a religious 
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identity as the guardian of the Maronites. Under the French colonialism, the 
party sided with this colonial power only to become an active force calling 
for independence later on.  However, the party kept its close ties to France 
and the West following the country’s independence and gained popularity 
among the Lebanese Christians. The party took the slogan "God, the 
Fatherland, and the Family" and favored an open economy. Its “ideology 
focuses on the primacy of preserving the Lebanese nation, but with a 
Phoenician identity, distinct from its Arab, Muslim neighbors” 239 . The 
policies of this party were against the armament of the Palestinians and anti-
communism and anti-Syrian. In other word, the party’s decisions were 
driven by both the desire to remain in power and the need to safeguard the 
Lebanese Phoenician identity and the Maronite community’s interests. 
During the 1975 Civil War, the Phalange Party developed its own militia 
and became a recognizable Christian force. Bashir Gemayel, the son of 
Pierre, led various sectarian battles and took charge of the party’s military 
wing, known as the Lebanese Forces. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
and the alliance between Israel and the Lebanese Forces resulted in the 
election of Bashir as president. The party was supported both by the United 
States and Israel especially when it comes to their battles against the PLO 
and as an anti-Nasserite force in Lebanon
240
. However, Bashir was 
assassinated and his post was inherited by his brother Amine, who is 
currently the head of the Phalange Party.  
The death of Pierre Gemayel in 1984 weakened the party which was 
factionalized later on. Following the war, the party’s influence dramatically 
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decreased until the year 2000. Amine’s son, Pierre tried, with the help of his 
father, to reconstruct the party. The anti-Syrian campaign unleashed by 
Pierre and his father pushed the pro-Syrian government to divide the party 
into two factions; “a pro-Syria faction, headed by Karim Pakradouni, and an 
anti-Syria faction, which remained under the control of the Gemayel 
family”241. 
With the Syrian withdrawal, both factions reconciled and the party was 
restored to its initial status under the leadership of Amine Gemayel. 
Currently, the party is part of March 14 alliance and continues to share 
special relations with the West, particularly France.  Gemayel sought to 
distance himself and his party by adopting a neutral policy regarding the 
Syrian war claiming that it serves Lebanon’s best interest and stimulate a 
reciprocal response from Syria to follow the same path
242
.  
In fact, the party expressed significant enthusiasm during the early 
beginning of the uprising in Syria. However, with time, the party began to 
articulate reservations regarding its initial stance. This is due in large to both 
the fear from the rise of radical Islamist groups and the fear that their 
decision would backfire should Assad survived
243
. The party’s policy 
continues to be driven by ideational and strategic interests.   
 4.2.6 The Lebanese Forces  
The Lebanese Forces (LF) was, as previously mentioned, the armed wing of 
the Phalange Party. The party “emerged as a political power in 1976 under 
the leadership of Bashir Jumayyil”244. It took anti-Palestinian policies and 
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sought to incorporate, willingly or forcibly, other Christian militias. As a 
result, in 1978 Tony Frangieh, the son of Suleiman Frangieh was killed 
along with his wife and daughter and the same was the fate of Dany 
Chamoun and his family in 1980. Thus, the LF became the most powerful 
Christian militia controlling East Beirut and Mount Lebanon. “Gemayel did 
not confine the LF to the military realm only; he created committees within 
the LF structure that had responsibility for health, information, foreign 
affairs, education, and other matters of public concern”245. The Lebanese 
forces thus not only advanced what they saw as Christian’s interests but also 
fought for them, thus giving the party a sectarian identity.  
The assassination of Bashir Gemayel in 1982 left the party vulnerable to 
succession struggles.  
The party suffered from internal power struggles and shifted from one 
leadership to another until it finally came under the leadership of Samir 
Geagea in 1986, a former militant in the Lebanese Forces. Geagea also went 
into intra-confessional battle with Michael Aoun, the head of the Free 
Patriotic Movement.   
As the civil war ended, the new Syrian-backed government in Lebanon 
sentenced Geagea to a lifetime of imprisonment based on charges related to 
the murder of Dany Chamoun and his family, the assassination of Rachid 
Karameh and the explosion of Our Lady of Deliverance Church in Zouk 
Mikael. This action came under a bigger strategy to undermine the 
Christian’s role in the country.  
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After 11 years of imprisonment, Geagea was released and the party was thus 
reestablished. The party continued to voice discontent against the Syrian 
regime and built closer ties with the West and became an influential 
member in the March 14 coalition. It saw the Syrian uprising as a chance for 
revenge against the Assad regime. Thus the Lebanese forces became one of 
the main supporters to the Syrian opposition
246
. Additionally, the party 
views the potential fall of Assad as an opportunity to diminish the power of 
Hezbollah
247
.  
4.2.7 Future Movement 
 Founded in 1993 by Rafik Hariri, the Future Movement has the support of 
the majority of the Lebanese Sunni community. Hariri was a powerful 
politician and an economic tycoon who amassed a significant fortune in 
Saudi Arabia working in the construction sector. Additionally, “by the 
1970s, he had become one of the royal family’s most important and trusted 
businessmen”248.  During and following the Lebanese civil war, he shifted 
his attention towards his home country and engaged in “charitable activities 
targeting mainly Sunnis but benefiting other communities as well”249. His 
political ties with key figures in Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, France and 
the United States and his efforts in the drafting to the Taif Accord led to 
Hariri’s recognition as a powerful Sunni leader 250 . This elevated the 
political aspirations of the Sunnis in Lebanon who suffered from a lack in 
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leadership. Adding to that, Hariri’s importance domestically and 
internationally caused discomfort in the Syrian regime and threatened the 
latter’s quest to maintain its influence in Lebanon’s politics. In other words, 
“Hariri had acquired an extraordinary stature as de facto head of state, 
bringing together broad Sunni support, a national vision and powerful 
international backing” 251 . Thus, Hariri differed from the country’s 
“traditional leaders, narrowly tied to their community interests, bitterly 
divided and thus – from Syria’s standpoint – easy to manipulate”252.  
Following the assassination of Hariri, his son, Saad Hariri inherited the 
leadership of the movement and also the post of prime minister in 2009. The 
movement is “currently the largest group in March 14 coalitions”253. The 
movement is known for its affiliation with Saudi Arabia and the West. The 
party blamed Syria not only for the Hariri’s assassination but also for not 
providing the Sunnis with the privileges granted to them in the Taif 
Accord
254
.   
An analysis of the Sunni community in general and the Future Movement in 
particular cannot be complete without referring to the regional context. 
Sunnis unlike other sects in Lebanon are not a minority in the region as they 
are located in an Arab World dominated by Sunnis. Therefore, the Future 
Movement, being the main representative of the Sunni community in 
Lebanon, has received substantial support from various Arab countries such 
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as Saudi Arabia. To this community, the Alawite dominated regime in Syria 
represents a form of repression to the Sunnis
255
.  
In 2008, Hariri paid a reconciliation visit to Assad in Syria. However, this 
visit did not wash away the feelings of hatred and with the eruption of the 
Syrian conflict, the party sought vengeance by backing the Syrian 
opposition
256. This stance faced two main problems; “one is a crisis of 
overconfidence, and the other the absence of leadership” as Hariri’s absence 
from the Lebanese’s scene damaged his image as a leader to the Sunnis257. 
In fact, Hariri’s “self-imposed exile” left the Sunnis without a visible leader 
which made increased the marginalization sentiment among the sect as 
Hezbollah’s domestic power increased and this led to the radicalization of 
various moderate Sunnis
258
.  The role of The Future Movement and its 
support of radical Sunni groups in Syria will be explored in the next 
chapter. 
In conclusion, political parties in Lebanon are characterized by their 
constructed sectarian identity, their leadership consisting of a Zaiim and 
their linkages with external forces all of which challenge the Lebanese state 
and its decision-making process specifically when it comes to foreign policy 
issues.  These parties’ interests are divided between materialistic aiming at 
remaining in power and achieving electoral gains and ideational seeking to 
advance their particular vision of Lebanon (being Phoenician, part of an 
Arab Ummah, linked to Syria and so on) and to safeguard the sectarian 
communities’ interests. Specific laws on the creation and regulation of the 
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political parties are not found neither in the constitution of 1926 nor in those 
that followed in 1943 National Pact and 1989 Taif Accord. The right to 
form political parties is thus taken indirectly from the freedom of 
association right found in Article 13 of the constitution. “Political party 
organizations have developed by default, based on the need to perpetuate 
and codify the electoral list system, which is the actual legal foundation of 
the multiparty regime in Lebanon”259.  
Additionally, the largest political parties in Lebanon are lead by a sectarian 
Zaiim. The popularity of the party depends on the popularity of its Zaiim. 
Political parties in Lebanon do not undergo the process of elections in order 
to choose their leader. These parties have taken on the role of states in 
providing basic social services not only to their members but also to others 
as they can be beneficial to their electoral strategies. In fact, the 
“clientelistic and confessional character of Lebanese society had led most 
political leaders to rely more on their extended family allegiances, 
respective religious denominations (including the confessional family status 
courts), regional loyalty networks, and the flagrant use of illegal practices 
such as vote buying and the rigging of polling stations, rather than on 
partisan political structures, ideologically based party programs, and 
detailed election platforms” 260 .  As these parties revolve around the 
patronage network of the Zaiim, the latter become the sole determinant of 
the party’s orientation. In order to survive domestically, this Zaiim must 
maintain relations with foreign forces which empower him, and thus his 
party, over other Zu’ama in the country. Therefore, safeguarding his foreign 
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relations becomes more important to his survival than abiding by the state’s 
policies. In other words, the type of alliances a Zaim holds outside Lebanon 
has an important explanatory value inside Lebanon itself. 
4.3 March 8 and March 14 
The endeavors to create cross-sectarian coalitions in Lebanon can be traced 
back to the early years of Lebanon’s independence which reflects an 
alliance between the Maronite President Bichara El Khouri and the Sunni 
Prime Minister Riyadh Al Solh. Yet, the most significant outcome of such 
coalition was the National Pact in 1943.  This pact resulted in a sectarian 
regime. Thus cross-sectarian affiliations do not necessarily indicate the 
building of secular identities.  
Following Hariri’s assassination around one million Lebanese gathered in a 
massive anti-Syrian protest on March 14, 2005 and demanded the 
withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon. Various Lebanese political 
parties and figures rushed to take part of this historical event and a coalition 
was formed taking the date of this protest as a name and became known by 
the March 14 Movement. Following Hariri’s death, Hassan Nasrallah and 
its allies gathered their supporters in a pro-Syrian protest to thank Syria for 
its assistance to Lebanon on March 8, 2005. Also a coalition was formed 
and was named after the day of the protest; March 8 Movement. Although 
Michel Aoun participated in the anti-Syrian demonstration on March 14, his 
party became considered part of the March 8 coalition following the latter’s 
alliance with Hezbollah. 
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Each coalition constructed a secular identity as it comprised parties with 
various religious affiliations. Their identities revolved around their vision of 
Lebanon’s foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis Syria.  
With Hariri’s death and the Cedar Revolution, sectarian divisions within the 
country became more visible especially among the Sunnis and the Shiites. 
However, divisions mostly centered on foreign policy issues. The result was 
the creation of cross-sectarian coalitions known by March 8 and March 14. 
The former lead by Hezbollah and its main allies being Amal Movement 
and the Free Patriotic Movement and the latter led by the Future Movement 
and its allies mainly the Lebanese Forces.  
Each of these two political movements had its own vision of Lebanon. 
March 14 perceived Lebanon as a Western ally that shares close ties with 
Saudi Arabia, whereas March 8 saw Lebanon as an essential part of the 
Syrian-Iranian alliance. Whereas March 14 gave primacy to disarming 
Hezbollah and obstructing Syria’s interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs, 
March 8 gave priority to resist the Western interference in Lebanon’s 
domestic affairs and to the Israeli threat. Thus, the period following 2005 
and the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon saw a redirection of sub-state 
foreign relations in a changing geopolitical regional setting.   
To be sure, both coalitions fought over state control each using their 
external alliance to increase their domestic political gains. Additionally, 
each movement sought to balance the power of the other.   
However, both coalitions developed their identities around ideational 
interests, to advance their own vision of Lebanon. March 8 saw Lebanon as 
a part of a greater regional alliance which aims at resisting at deterring the 
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Israeli threat whereas March 14 perceived Lebanon as a country open to the 
West and to Saudi Arabia. Just as the National Pact, the outcomes of these 
cross-sectarian alliances aim to serve the interest of sectarian groups. March 
14 advances mainly the interest of the Sunnis whereas March 8 advances 
mostly the desires of the Shiites. This has been reflected in deadlocks and 
the inability to reach a consensus on new electoral laws for instance even 
within the same coalition.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 
SYRIAN UPRISING 
With the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, divisions in adjacent 
Lebanon intensified. “For half the country, Syria is a sister-state with which 
Lebanon shares a special relationship”261. This relates specially to March 8 
coalitions and its leading part, Hezbollah. “For the other half, Syria was a 
long time occupier who still has too much say into who governs 
Lebanon”262 as in the case of March 14 coalition headed by the Future 
Movement.   
The regional and international responses of various states to the Syrian war 
diversified.  The reactions of governments ranged between the expulsion of 
Syrian diplomats, as the United States and Saudi Arabia, to calls for reform 
and the support of Bashar al-Assad regime, as Russia and China. When the 
eyes turned to Lebanon’s reaction, the government headed then by Prime 
Minister Najib Mikati took the decision not to interfere and adopt a policy 
of disassociation. Thus, Lebanon will neither publicly support nor oppose 
Assad’s regime263. The Baabda Declaration placed national interests over 
sub-national or supra-national ones. This restored many Lebanese’ faith in 
having a united and coherent foreign policy thus paving the way to the 
development of a national identity replacing sectarian and other forms of 
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identities. However, parties in Lebanon did not abide by this policy and the 
government has adopted this policy only in rhetoric and not in deed. In fact, 
sectarian identities developed and intensified and once again came to be 
more significant than national identity. The following section explores the 
Syrian uprising and its culmination into a bloody civil war that persists until 
the time of writing. It also highlights the implication of the Syrian crisis on 
neighboring Lebanon and the latter’s foreign policy revealing how 
ideational and sectarian interests took once again precedent over national 
ones.  
5.1 Overview of Syrian Uprising 
Prior to 2011, Syria has been described as a successful case of 
“authoritarian modernization”; the acquisition of the presidency by young 
and educated Bashar Al Assad raised hopes of reforms among Syrians
264
.  
However, eleven years following Bashar’s election, or rather inheritance, of 
the presidency, the Syrian regime came under challenge from within. What 
are the reasons that led to the Syrian Uprising? How did a peaceful protest 
turn into a bloody civil war? In order to better understand the Syrian 
Uprising, it is important to explore the changes that took place under 
Bashar’s presidency.   
5.1.1 Bashar Al Assad’s Rule 
In 2000, president Hafiz Al Assad died after ruling over Syria for almost 
three decades. His son Bashar was prepared to inherit his father’s position. 
In fact, the “party and army elite closed ranks and, to prevent a power 
struggle, ratified the process Hafiz had begun of establishing his son, 
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Bashar, as his successor” 265 . Holding an education from a western 
university and being relatively young, Bashar was perceived as the president 
who would modernize Syria. The country witnessed administrative, 
economic, political and social reforms.  
The young president sought to incorporate the country’s economy into the 
world market. He also called for transparency and ending bribery.  Under 
his rule, the “government took steps to end nearly four decades of state 
monopoly over banking and foreign exchange, introduced legislation to 
encourage foreign investment and relax rent control, spearheaded efforts to 
enhance the autonomy of state-owned enterprises and undertook some 
educational reforms, including private schools and universities” 266 . 
Politically, opposition parties such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood as 
well as leftists and Marxists parties became more dynamic. Calls for greater 
freedom and reforms were tolerated, private magazines were granted a 
license to publish, the internet was introduced and forums for public 
expressions thrived. Additionally, a significant number of political prisoners 
were released and two of the country’s well-known prisons were shut 
down
267
.  
However, the jubilation surrounding the new president did not persist as 
reforms came to a halt.  
“Bashar’s economic liberalization project, initially matched by an opening 
to Western Europe, was quickly jeopardized by the collapse of the peace 
process with Israel and the parallel souring of Syrian–US relations”268. As a 
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result, Syria shifted to Saddam’s Iraq who was also in bad terms with the 
US following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990
269
. Syria’s revenues increased 
from the trade of low-cost Iraqi oil- being pumped into Syrian-Iraqi 
pipeline
270
. Although the invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave the Syrian regime 
authenticity and allowed it to play the nationalist card against the US 
occupation, it imposed serious economic costs on Syria.  
Aiming at isolating Syria economically, the US imposed sanctions on the 
latter which reflected negatively on western investment and on the country’s 
service sector
271
. The fall of Saddam and his regime also posed serious 
threats to Syria and the Baath regime’s survival. Expectations of additional 
reforms and fast change increased. Indeed the regime took several steps in 
the first few months following the 2003 invasion such as providing license 
to two private universities and allowing some NGOs, mainly those working 
on the environment and women’s to function272. In 2005, Syrian troops 
withdrew from Lebanon as a result of popular demand within Lebanon 
backed by an international support, mainly by the West.  As a result, 
opposition within Syria was encouraged to forge alliance with foreign 
forces. However, the regime mobilized support by playing the nationalist 
card and strengthening anti-Western sentiments
273
.  
Following this period, Bashar asserted “that democratization had to follow 
economic modernization rather than precede it”274. Bashar followed a path 
similar to that undertaken in China; stability is ensured through one-party 
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rule and modernization is achieved through economic reforms. In that year 
alone, Assad signed more than a hundred laws and presidential decrees 
addressing reforms in both the economic and administrative fields which 
stimulated the growth of the private sector and loosened the governmental 
grip over the economy
275
.  
Although neither these reforms nor this growth reflected on the political 
scene of the country, Syria’s economy prior to the outbreak of the uprising 
was diverse and witnessed a remarkable growth. In 2009, the government’s 
revenue was estimated around 600 billion Syrian lira
276
. The government 
relied heavily on tax and oil revenues as pillars of its budget, the latter 
amounting to 150 billion Syrian liras
277
 in the year prior to the uprising
278
. 
Adding to that, until the outbreak of the uprising, the GDP per capita among 
Syria was counted around $5,000
279
. Socially, “nearly 90 percent of Syrian 
children attended primary or secondary schools and between eight and nine 
in 10 Syrians had achieved literacy”280. That being said, what are the causes 
that led to the outbreak of protests in “stable Syria” and to the failure of 
“authoritarian upgrading” to inoculate Syria from the wave of the “Arab 
Spring”?  
5.1.2 Roots of contention 
“Contentious politics emerges in response to changes in political 
opportunities and constraints, with participants responding to a variety of 
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incentives” 281 . “Building on these opportunities, and using known 
repertoires of action, people with limited resources can act together 
contentiously- if only sporadically”282.   
In March 2011, 15 students from Daraa governorate were arrested after 
writing down “people want the fall of the regime” (“Ash-shab yurid isqat 
an-nizam”) on a school wall. This event sparked a wave of protest in the 
rural city and was perceived as the flame that ignited the Syrian uprising. 
However, just as the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia, this 
event does not reflect the sole reason behind the emergence of discontent. In 
fact, just as Tunisians and Egyptians, Syrians shared grievances which are 
highly important in understanding mobilization. 
To begin with, the growth of the Syrian economy in the past decade did not 
reflect in increasing the number of job offers. In fact, economic reforms and 
the invigoration of the private sector resulted in crony capitalism and the 
creation of “new monopolies controlled by members of the governing elite 
rather than avenues through which new players can gain wealth and political 
influence”283.  Consequently, partnerships and cooperation between regime 
crony capitalists and the bourgeoisie grew and families and clans affiliated 
with the regime became influential economic players.  
Additionally, UN reports highlighted that approximately 2million Syrians 
live in extreme poverty and more than half of the citizens in north-east 
Syrian are unemployed
284
.   With the absence of unemployment benefits and 
the frustration of a growing young and educated population, the situation 
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became aggravated. Adding salt to injury was the “removal of subsidies on 
agricultural inputs, decline of farm support prices and neglect of the system 
of agricultural planning and cooperatives, whose underpaid officials 
demanded bribes for their services, combined with the terrible drought of 
2007–2010”285 all of which reflected negatively on the agricultural industry. 
Moreover, the country’s military branches are headed by elites who are 
related to and belong to the same religious sect of the Assad family, the 
Alawite sect which infuriated the Sunnis who represent the majority of the 
country’s population286.  
The frustration increased further when the government failed to deliver the 
numerous political reforms which have been promised by Assad.  Among 
the promises were enacting a law related to political parties, allowing 
private print media to be established and lifting the state of emergency that 
has been operational for almost five decades
287
. But if these grievances have 
existed among Syrians for the past decade what changed now? What led a 
number of Syrians to act contentiously?  
The existence of similar sources of grievances among the citizens of the 
Arab World has facilitated the diffusion of protest movements within the 
Arab World various countries. This has also resulted in the spill-over of 
protests’ tactics and strategies as well as slogans. The effect of the Arab 
uprising and the overthrow of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan presidents 
encouraged the Syrian opposition to follow the same path. Social media and 
the internet played also a catalyzing role in the evolution of protests within 
Syria. Just as Tarrow described the role of print media in connecting people 
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and informing them about especially were contentious disruptions in distant 
areas, social media and the internet provided Syrians with knowledge of the 
occurrences in distant countries. Being uncontrollable by the regime, Syrian 
protestors relied heavily on the internet and social media to voice their 
discontent and break their news to the world.  
Adding to that, “a key role was played by disaffected Diaspora-based 
Syrians, many the children of exiles, now able for the first time to use the 
internet to encourage dissent inside Syria”288. This provided an opportunity 
to the opposition at home to take the streets, taking the arrest of the students 
as their main event and calling for reforms. However, what came to be a 
peaceful protest calling for reforms soon tuned into violent confrontations 
calling for the fall of the regime and ouster of Bashar Al Assad and 
culminated eventually into a bloody civil war that persist until the time of 
writing.   
5.1.3 From Peaceful Protest to Civil War 
How did a peaceful protest calling for reform and justice in March 2011 
turn into one of the most brutal and bloody civil war in recent history? To 
begin with, small protests took place in Syria on January 2011 being 
influence by the wave of the Arab uprising. The regime’s initial response 
was to “exploit citizens’ fear of civil war, as happened in Iraq with post-
invasion ‘democratization’, pointing also to the chaos unleashed by the 
revolt in Homs” 289 . Assad’s regime also “played on fear of foreign 
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interference and raised the Palestine issue by organizing demonstrations on 
the Golan”290.  
However when the protests intensified in the city of Daraa following the 
arrest of students, the Syrian government announced that it would undertake 
various steps towards reform. Among the announcements were decisions to 
increase salaries of state employees, lifting the state of emergency and 
granting licenses to political parties
291
. Around one month later, the Syrian 
president fulfilled its pledge to lift the state of emergency, closed down the 
Higher State Security Court and released a decree that legalize the right to 
peaceful demonstrations
292
.  
Despite these announcements, the regime resorted to harsh repression 
cracking down protests and despite the lift of the emergency law, security 
forces kept on using “violence with impunity”293. The Syrian opposition 
presented itself as a secular and democratic entity in order to attract as many 
participants as possible and to draw support from the West.  
However, as the regime’s response became more violent, the protestors 
became less numerous and more radical.  “Contested by armed resistance 
from military defectors, the regime lost control over some areas, leaving a 
vacuum filled by a combination of civil society solidarity and 
criminality”294.  
Additionally, the opposition’s weakness and fragmentation empowered 
Assad regime. The Syrian National Council (SNC) was created in Istanbul 
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in August 2011 out of the need of international support
295
. However the 
SNC has not gathered the needed internal backing to become a serious 
threat to the Baath regime. As violence increased, the regime played on the 
fear of sectarian minorities portraying the opposition as a Sunni radical 
movement being supported by Saudi Arabia and the West
296
. The middle 
classes and the bourgeoisie in the country favored a peaceful transition to 
democracy and continued supporting Bashar fearing the loss of their 
interests and the arrival of radicals to power. It should also be mentioned 
that despite increased defections in the security apparatus, the regime as 
well as the army remained relatively unified
297
.  
As days passed by, slaughters and violence committed by both sides were 
reported and both sides exchanged accusations on the use of hard explosives 
and weapons. Two years following the crisis, the regime was accused of 
employing chemical weapons which increased the talks about an 
international involvement as well as direct US intervention in Syria. China 
and Russia used their veto against UN Security Council and UN sanctions 
on Syria. A US-Russian deal was reached that requested the removal and 
destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons298. Additionally, the opposition’s 
fragmentation between the SNC, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the 
National Coordinating Council resulted in the discouragement of regional 
and international forces to provide them with arms capable of fighting the 
regime
299
.  
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What followed this phase “re-framed the conflict in religious and sectarian 
terms with terrorist overtones, and inextricably nested it in broader regional 
‘conflict by proxy’ logic”300 . This period saw the speedy emergence of 
radical religious groups.  The Islamic Front which united various groups as 
Ahrar al-Sham and the Islam Army, Jabhet Al Nasra (JAN) as well as the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) depicted themselves as the guardians 
of the Syrian Sunnis which culminated the  Sunni-Shiite divide and tension 
in the country and the region
301
.  
 With more than 1000 deaths in the first year of the conflict and with its 
entry into its fourth year of conflict approaching 200,000 fatalities, there is 
no longer doubt that Syria has plunged into a civil war. The crisis has left 
around 3million refugees dispersed into neighboring countries. The majority 
of these refugees fled to Lebanon which currently hosts over 1,142,425 
Syrians
302
. The intensification of the conflict in neighboring Syria places 
significant risks on Lebanon’s political stability and security. How is the 
Syrian civil war casting being reflected into Lebanon? What is the link 
between the Syrian uprising and Lebanon’s foreign policy?   
5.2 Effect on Lebanon 
“It was inevitable that sooner or later the bloodshed in Syria, grafted onto 
existing tensions in Lebanon, would transform the Lebanese sectarian 
struggle from a primarily political one to an increasingly and notably more 
“religious” conflict (…) whereby communities, however imagined or over-
constructed, perceive themselves as defending not only their share in the 
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country’s power structure, but their very existence and survival—so that 
interest-based political turf lines are being replaced by identity-based 
imaginary boundaries”303.  
In the early beginnings of the uprising, Lebanon internal division intensified 
into two camps; those supporting the Assad regime and those supporting 
rebels. Responses to the Syrian crisis were at first limited to speeches made 
by some Lebanese figures and public peaceful demonstrations either in 
support or in opposition to the Syrian regime. However, as the conflict in 
Syria intensified, Lebanon descended into chaos.  
The first and most visible effect of the Syrian crisis has been reflected in the 
clashes between Alawites and Sunnis residing in Tripoli.  “Fighters of Bab 
Tebbaneh now see their actions against of the decades-long conflict 
opposing the areas of Jabal Mohsen and Bab Tebbaneh in Tripoli”304. A 
series of car bombings followed targeting Beirut suburbs resided by Shiites 
leaving behind a number of casualties. Fearing that the Syrian war would 
turn into a Lebanese war and in order to contain the surmounting sectarian 
tension, Mikati’s government adopted a policy of disassociation reflected in 
the Baabda Declaration.  
5.2.1 The Baabda Declaration: 
As the outbreak of peaceful protests demanding the departure of Assad in 
Syria soon turned into a bloody civil war, Lebanon adopted a policy of 
“disassociation”. The policy was translated in the “Baabda Declaration”; an 
agreement between the various Lebanese political groups. This arrangement 
demanded to distance Lebanon from the Syrian conflict across the borders 
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in order to avoid the negative spillover of such tensions into the country
305
. 
The Baabda Declaration came to place national interests over sectarian and 
ideational desires, thus raising the hopes of taking the first step towards 
building national identity. However, the supporting or opposing responses 
of Lebanon’s political parties to the Syrian regime, made it difficult to abide 
by the demands of the Baabda Declaration asserting that sub-groups and 
non-state actors’ identities are stronger than national ones. Thus, Lebanon’s 
foreign relations became a tool used by the Zu’ama domestically and 
foreign actors regionally and internationally and sectarianism has been 
exploited by these players to justify alliances.  
5.2.1.1 Its Content: 
On June 11, 2012, the National Dialogue Committee headed by the 
Lebanese President, General Michel Suleiman issued the Baabda 
Declaration in response to the recent developments taking place in Lebanon 
as well as the region, especially in Syria. The declaration contained major 
decisions on which the leading parties in Lebanon agreed. To begin with, 
the declaration gave primacy to dialogue over any other conflict-solving 
mean and called for the avoidance of tension in speeches and the 
concentration on the commonalities rather than the frictions of all factions 
and called for the execution of socioeconomic development strategies
306
.  
The agreement held all parties equally responsible in ensuring stability and 
in preventing the country from being pulled into any kind of strife and stress 
on the importance of enhancing “state institutions, encourage a culture of 
reliance on the law and legitimate institutions for the resolution of any 
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contention or urgent issue.”307. From this point, the judiciary must seek the 
imposition of the law equally and fairly and the army must be supported 
both morally and materially. Moreover, all factions were asked to respect 
the Taif Agreement as well as all international resolutions (such as that of 
the Security Council 1701) and Lebanon must be sidelined away from all 
regional tensions; therefore the Lebanese-Syrian borders must be controlled 
and Lebanon must maintain a policy of neutralization also known as the 
policy of disassociation in which no faction would participate in the Syrian 
conflict in order to avoid the Syrian crisis repercussion on its domestic 
scene
308
. The Baabda Declaration gained the consensus of all parties. 
However, it was destined to failure as it faced many limitations and 
breaching of its content.  
5.2.1.2 Its Limitation: 
As history repeats itself, the Baabda Declaration was fated to failure for the 
same reasons that challenged the National Pact in 1943; the incapacity of 
parties in Lebanon to remain neutral from regional crisis. In fact, Lebanon’s 
institutions have been historically weak which strengthened sectarian and 
kinship ties and encouraged the emergence of sub-state actors which are 
more powerful than the state itself. The state’s direction has been headed 
toward failure. According to Stewart Patrick, weak states “struggle to 
maintain a monopoly on the use of force, provide security from external and 
internal threats, control borders and territory, ensure public order and 
provide safety from crime”309.  
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Additionally, a weak state is one filled with corruption in its judiciary and 
political institutions thus endangering the basic foundation of democracy 
ranging from accountability to justice and protection of rights. Not to 
mention, a weak state finds difficulties in meeting with the basic economic 
needs of its population such as health and education not to mention its 
weakness in providing an environment suitable for business and investment. 
The analysis of Lebanon based on this spectrum is beyond the scope of this 
research. However, the presence of armed factions who possess a certain 
level of autonomy within the state undermines the latter’s presence and 
weakens it further and this has been revealed in the recent conflict within 
and over Syria.   
To begin with, the sectarian strife among Sunnis-Shiites escalated following 
the assassination of Wissam Al Hassan in October 2012.  The later was a 
key player in the Lebanese domestic politics. Prior to Hariri’s assassination, 
Al Hassan took charge of the security guard responsible of safeguarding 
Hariri. In 2006, he became the head of the Internal Security Forces’ 
Information Branch participating in the investigations surrounding Hariri’s 
murder and uncovering Israeli espionage
310.  “Hassan proved to be a key 
pillar of the Sunni community and of the March 14 coalition in terms both 
of security and intelligence gathering”311. The murder of Hassan posed a 
serious challenge to the survival of the Baabda Declaration.  
Adding to that, the presence of Hezbollah’s arms has been highly debated 
among different Lebanese actors. Its recent overt participation in the Syrian 
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war has been perceived both as a breach to the Baabda Declaration which 
called for the neutralization of all Lebanese parties and as an independent 
decision which ignores the statehood of Lebanon and drags the country into 
a fierce conflict, portraying Hezbollah as a “state within a state”312.  For 
Hezbollah, the survival of the Assad’s regime is necessary at all costs and 
for many reasons among which we mention the supply of arms, surveillance 
of roads to ensure their delivery, and the protection from regional threats 
(emerging either by Israel or from Arab countries)
313
. Furthermore, Syria’s 
Alawite regime and Baath Party, prior to the Bashar’s presidency shared 
close ties with Shiite leaders in both Lebanon and Iran such as Musa Al-
Sadr 
314
. In fact, Alawites and Shiites share the same religious doctrine. 
Both sects believe “that leadership of the Islamic world—and rights to 
interpret the faith—should have descended through Prophet Mohammed’s 
family after his death” 315 . Therefore, in their belief, Ali, the prophet’s 
relative and son-in-law was entitled of being the first caliph
316
.   Sunnis, on 
the other hand, consider that the prophet’s advisors are entitled to 
succession. Since the 800s, “Alawites struggled for legitimacy and 
recognition from other Muslims” 317 . Efforts to increase the Shiites –
Alawites theological rapprochement increased in the past years. “This has 
been partly due to the decline of Arab nationalism and rise of the religious 
factor in making political alliances and defining identity” 318 . Thus, 
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Damascus became a bridge that links the Shiite community from Iran 
throughout Iraq, Kuwait and Lebanon. Therefore, both Hezbollah and Iran 
have high interest in preserving the Assad regime in Syria and the 
geographical proximity of both Lebanon and Iran to Syria facilitated the 
interference of Hezbollah and increased the Iranian influence in Syria.  
In short, the existence of the current regime in Syria justifies the existence 
and strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon.  Undeniably, “within Lebanon’s two-
level game, losing an external patron does not merely mean a loss of 
strategic depth or a supply source, but the risk of domestic political 
marginalization”319. From this sense, Hezbollah was willing to disregard the 
impact that his participation in the Syrian war could have on Lebanon, being 
the fueling of sectarian divide and the loss of his Christian allies so as to 
support the regime in Syria. The resignation of  Mikati’s government in 
March 2013 has loosen the bare for Hezbollah’s activity in Syria as it can 
no longer be held accountable under the existing void in Lebanon
320
.  
On Monday July 22, 2013, the European Union foreign ministers met in 
Brussels and unanimously agreed to blacklist Hezbollah’s armed wing, 
labeling it as a terrorist group
321
. The decision taken by the EU against 
Hezbollah did not provide an incentive for the latter to limit its interference 
in the Syrian conflict. Various Lebanese groups saw the crisis in Syria as an 
opportunity to either show their loyalty for or vengeance against the Assad 
regime such as Hezbollah and the Future Movement respectively.  
The assassination of Hariri in 2005, the invasion of Beirut Sunni 
neighborhood in 2008, the collapse of Saad Hariri’s government in 2011 
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and the hope of bringing in a new Sunni regime in Syria has shaped the 
Future Movement’s position regarding the Syrian crisis. The party found in 
the Syrian uprising an opportunity for revenge against the Assad regime and 
a tool to reduce Hezbollah’s weight within Lebanon and the region 322 .  
Although it denied any direct participation in the Syrian crisis, “Future 
Movement MP Okab Sakr was acting as an arms coordinator between 
Syrian opposition fighters and Arab Gulf funders, presumably from Saudi 
Arabia”323. If truth be told, the Baabda Declaration was destined to failure 
from the start due in large to March 8 and March 14's indifference to the 
security and stability of the country they both allege to worry so profoundly 
about.   
 In addition to that, Sunni radicals operating under Lebanese leadership 
have been crossing borders to take part in the fights in Syria such as Jund al-
Sham and Kataib al-Muqawama al-Hurrah which is headed by Ahmad al-
Assir
324
. These factors have dragged Lebanon into the Syrian war and 
plunged it into more deadlocks and insecurity as series of assassinations and 
blasts has been rotating between Tripoli, Beirut and the southern district of 
the capital leaving behind many casualties and material damages not to 
mention bringing with it the failure of the Baabda declaration.  
5.2.2 Foreign Policy of Sub-Groups 
With the intensification of the Syrian civil war and the failure of the policy 
of neutralization, Lebanon became a fertile land to two groups crossing the 
poorly defined and monitored Lebanese-Syrian borders; rebels and 
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refugees
325
. To begin with, the uncontrollable flow of Syrian civilians 
arriving into Lebanon soon became a threat to the country’s stability. 
Geographically small and lacking enough resources, Lebanon have already 
been struggling to meet the need of its roughly four million residents and 
the need of the approximately 450,000 Palestinians seeking refuge in this 
country
326
. Absorbing more refugees proved to be problematic to Lebanon’s 
economy. World Bank report, as cited by the Daily Star in 2013, stated that 
the Syrian crisis in the past two years might result in cutting “Lebanon’s 
real GDP growth by 2.9 percentage points each year, pushing a further 
170,000 Lebanese into poverty, over and above the 1 million already living 
below the poverty line”327. Nonetheless, the economic cost of the refugee 
crisis is the least of Lebanon’s worries.  
In fact, it is the political and security risks that comes along with the 
decision of hosting around 1million refugees that are distressing. Bringing 
Syrians refugees into an unstable political and sectarian environment turned 
the refugee crisis into a ticking time bomb waiting to explode at any 
moment. “Mostly Sunnis who left their country on account of the violence 
exercised against them by the Assad regime, these refugees now saw their 
country as largely Alawite and as supported by their Shia relatives in 
Lebanon”328.  
Moreover, most of the Syrian refugees reside in Lebanese regions near the 
Syrian border. These regions happen to witness the climax of the Shiites-
Sunnis tensions such as Arsal or Majdel-Anjar which metamorphosed 
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rapidly into headquarters to “a Syrian mini-society, in open confrontation 
with a Hezbollah-led resistance counter-society, already powerfully present 
in the same regions”329 . Ironically, Salafi networks in various Lebanese 
regions such as Akkar, Tripoli, and western Bekaa that were encouraged 
during the 80s by the Syrian regime and its intelligence in Lebanon, rushed 
into the help of their Syrian brethren either in sending them aid and 
smuggling arms or providing medical care to the Syrian Free Army
330
.  
With the complete militarization of the Syrian uprising, Hassan Nasrallah, 
declared that complete involvement of Hezbollah in the Syrian war was not 
just for the protection of Shiite regions in Syria as alleged previously, but to 
support Assad. “From then on, the Assad regime’s fate would be 
inextricably linked to Hezbollah’s, and Lebanon’s political equilibrium 
would be fatally intertwined with Syria’s”331. By sheltering and protecting 
Syrians in northern Lebanon, Islamists reactivated their communal ties. 
Prior to the Syrian crisis, Islamists followed one of the two available 
choices; they either kept a low profile or went into alliance with local 
politicians to obtain political and security shield.  
However, following the uprising in Syria and the overt rise of Islamists in 
the region, Islamists in Lebanon no longer require political support as they 
are now acting on their own. Their mobilization no longer depended on the 
orders of the Future Movement or other political factions
332
. Following the 
copy-cat logic, Islamists in the country sought to follow the same path of 
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Hezbollah and arm themselves
333
. Being incapable of challenging 
Hezbollah’s domination in several regions of the country, they have decided 
to imitate it.  
The most dangerous spillover of Syria’s crisis into Lebanon appeared in the 
beginning of August 2014, when Lebanon's army forces (LAF) and Islamist 
armed groups belonging to IS
334
 and Jabhet Al Nasra
335
 clashed in the 
Lebanese town of Arsal. Members of the Lebanese army and security forces 
were taken captive by the militants
336
. As a result, Muslim clerics took the 
initiative to start negotiating the release of the soldiers. Moreover, IS 
succeeded in emboldening militants in Lebanon who share with them the 
same beliefs and radicalists began appearing in Beirut and its suburbs. The 
country’s numerous political factions along with the clerics and Islamists 
groups have been pursuing their separate agendas enhancing or creating ties 
with foreign powers.  
March 14 camp and precisely the Future Movement have fortified its 
relations with the West and Saudi Arabia whereas March 8 coalition and 
particularly Hezbollah have been increasingly supporting the Assad regime 
and strengthening its ties with Iran. The “shadow war between Hezbollah 
and al-Qaeda as well as the Iran-Saudi proxy battle in Lebanon 
intensify”337. Yet political leaders of Lebanon's multiple sects are losing 
their control over their communities as clerics and religious figures are 
gaining more importance and becoming more active in the political scene. 
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Lebanon's Sunni community has been suffering from a lack of a clear 
leadership over the years and this has encouraged radicals to fill the void
338
.  
As a result, a significant rise in Sunni militancy is taken place. These 
radicals have been allying with foreign Sunni radicals following their tactics 
in bombing civilian areas
339
. Syrian jihadist organizations such as Jabhat al-
Nusra and Islamic State extended their territories and became visible in 
Lebanon. Lebanese citizens, feeling more and more insecure, organized 
neighborhood patrols and adopted self-protection strategies.  
All this led to the paralysis of Lebanese state institutions. The continuing 
stalemate in the cabinet led to a political vacuum resulting in the 
adjournment of presidential elections and leaving the country to be 
governed without a president.  The LAF, the institution that has the most 
national support, has faced increasing pressures and accusation and became 
target to Sunni extremists
340
. With weak state institutions, Lebanon is 
unable to control these groups. As each follow its personal agenda, 
disregarding the presence of a state, Lebanon’s foreign policy sees no 
chances of developing a clear and coherent form. Sectarian identities have 
once again prevailed over national identity. 
Briefly, the Syrian crisis revealed the significance of sub and supra-national 
identities in the analysis of Lebanon’s foreign policy and in understanding 
the behavior of non-state actors which neglect the state by conducting their 
own external relations. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
The confessional system which has been constructed in Lebanon due to 
several historical, political and social reasons strengthened the sub-identity 
groups and contributed to the eradication of state’s authority. The state has 
been historically unable to be the sole holder of coercive means. The 
various confessional factions within the country have only enhanced their 
alliances with external forces which contributed to the lack of a unified 
foreign policy in Lebanon. Rather, the country ended up with multiple 
foreign policies “due to the power of sub-state actors and the absence of 
strong national identity”341.  
Adding to the domestic contestation, regional and international actors have 
been interfering in the country’s affairs and trying to manipulate the foreign 
policy of the country through their alliances with local groups and parties in 
order to push forward their interests. The increase in the intensity of the 
conflict in Syria has deepened the polarization in Lebanon and amplified 
sectarian divides among Sunnis and Shiites.  The fallout of the Syrian 
conflict in Lebanon has been revealed in the unrest which erupted in Tripoli 
between pro-Assad Alawite and pro-opposition Sunnis, the falling of Syrian 
missiles on Lebanese soils, the assassination of Mohammad Shattah
342
 and 
the blasts in the Beirut’s southern neighborhood which has been announced 
as a blow to Hezbollah by Syrian rebels linked to Al-Qaeda.  
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More recently, the kidnapping of soldiers in Arsal and the clashes between 
the Lebanese army and Islamic State (IT) along with Jabhet Al Nasra 
signaled the plunging of Lebanon into the Syrian crisis.  Moreover, the 
Saudi’s pledge to grant $3 billion towards military aid to Lebanon has been 
perceived as an attempt to empower the Lebanese government and to 
counter the power of the Iranian backed Hezbollah
343
, all of which poses 
further obstacle towards adopting a coherent Lebanese foreign policy. 
“Lebanon’s domestic political balance, and the role of regional, or 
international actors hinder its ability to craft a unified foreign policy to 
achieve national objectives”344.  
The interests and behavior of sub-groups in Lebanon can only be explained 
through understanding their identities and how they have been shaped. “In 
Lebanon, parochial interests take precedence over national ones”345. From 
this perspective, the constructivist approach provides an additional 
perspective through which Lebanon’s foreign policy can be better 
examined. This is not to say that this approach faces no challenges 
whatsoever. This conclusion   highlights the strength and limitation of the 
constructivist approach in explaining Lebanon’s foreign policy before 
concluding with the current and persistent challenges facing the creation of 
a coherent national foreign policy.  
6.1 Constructivism’s Strength in Explaining Lebanon’s FP 
Constructivism offers an additional perspective to understanding Lebanon 
in which identities and ideologies represent a significant source of dispute. 
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Constructivism as a result can be employed to explain the structure of 
alliances of sub-state actors in Lebanon with external actors and “is helpful 
in demystifying Lebanese foreign policy making”346. The deterioration of 
the state and the lack of a strong national identity provided a platform to 
sub-state actors to develop their personal agendas and build alliances with 
foreign actors, sharing similar political and pious desires. The presence of 
various sub-state identity groups each pursing its own interest and 
developing its own foreign policy means that the government will issue 
policies based on the interest of groups. Adding to that, the foreign policy of 
sub-groups within the weak state of Lebanon does not always cohere with 
that of the central government.  
Sub-state actors are loyal to their political or religious Zaiim and are 
affected by their supra-state identities that determine their coalitions with 
outside forces. Constantly seeking to advance their agendas through 
alliances with foreign actors, domestic actors encouraged foreign 
intervention.  Lebanon’s foreign policy thus is determined by the desires of 
sub-state actors who go into alliances with foreign actors in order to push 
forward their own agenda and challenge their opponents domestically. All 
this came at the expense of Lebanon’s autonomy and resulted in the failure 
to develop a unitary foreign policy.  
From this perspective, constructivism’s strength in explaining Lebanon’s 
foreign policy lies in its ability to explain non-military conflicts as well as 
proxy wars. It also helps in understanding that the involvement of 
Hezbollah in the war in Syria goes beyond material interest and quest for 
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power. The reasons of such interference also are found in understanding the 
group’s identity. Constructivism also explains how the threat to countries 
such as Lebanon is found not only at the external level but also from within 
as these sub-state identities have “a greater influence than anarchy on state 
behavior”347.  
In fact, “Lebanon is not only a battleground for military conflict, but also an 
ideological battleground (and) domestic factors are another source of 
international ideological conflict”348 . To exemplify, the regional contest 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran have been reflected on the Lebanese 
domestic scene. Both states seek to increase their religious and political 
influence in the region; Saudi Arabia aims with its pro-Western orientation 
at preserving its position as leader of the Sunnis whereas Iran challenges 
Saudi’s status as a major regional player with its anti-Western policy349.  
Constructivism assists in understanding conflicts among leaders and which 
realism deems as unimportant. Realism believes that leaders seek to 
safeguard the state’s interests on the long run which is not the case in 
Lebanon as each leader aims at protecting his community’s and sect’s 
interests. Lebanon cannot be perceived as a unitary state as various non-
state actors are highly important in the decision-making process.   
To sum it up, the Lebanese government is not the sole determinant in the 
making of the Lebanese foreign policy. Sub-state actors with their supra-
state identity and external relations, are key players in the making of the 
Lebanese foreign policy. The importance of these sub-state identity groups 
gave constructivism a step ahead in adding new perspective to better 
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understanding the lack of a unified Lebanese foreign policy. This is not to 
say that this approach faces no challenges whatsoever.  Constructivism 
“certainly holds considerable potentials as an applied framework for 
understanding foreign policy”350. 
6.2 Limitations of Constructivism in Explaining Lebanon’s 
FP 
Although constructivist acknowledge the importance of material interests 
their emphasis rest however on ideational factors and social norms. 
However, by looking at Lebanon’s system of alliances, constructivism faces 
various challenges. Although constructivism sheds an important light on the 
importance of identity in the building of alliance, it does not focus much on 
material interest which also plays a decisive role in Lebanon. To illustrate, 
constructivism fails to explain the cross-sectarian alliances that resulted in 
two coalitions March 8 and March 14 from a balance of power perspective. 
Additionally, constructivists fail to explain cross-sectarian alliances of the 
Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah which aims at deterring the power 
of the future movement and gaining more influence within the government. 
Therefore, both interest and identities are necessary in understanding the 
system of alliance within Lebanon.  
Also, this approach does not explore the problem of “uncertainty” in an 
anarchic world system in which “states are always seeking security, moves 
in that direction can be misread by other states, that is what the security 
dilemma is all about”351. This uncertainty other state’s intentions challenges 
constructivists who assume that interaction among states is based on the 
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understanding of intentions among them. Thus Lebanon became a platform 
on which major power contest. 
Looking at Lebanon, the uncertainty among the various sub-state actors 
have resulted in fear and thus dependency on foreign actors. “Any change 
contains threatening possibility that one’s position may weaken, leading to a 
lessening of one’s status and rejection of one’s identity”352. This has been a 
disabling factor when it comes to drafting a unified foreign policy. 
Additionally, the outbreak of the civil war confirmed the vulnerability of 
Lebanon to the influences of the regional and international system.  
Social norms according to constructivists are determinant in the explanation 
of a country’s foreign policy. These norms precede interests, orient the 
behavior of actors, and are intersubjective. The importance given to these 
norms have created unanswered questions challenging the constructivist’s 
approach. Where do these norms originate from? How important are 
international norms when they are often disregarded if it serves the interest 
of powerful states? How are these norms applied in Lebanon? 
There is not a single theory that can best explain the complexity of 
Lebanon’s foreign policy and its making. Neither realism nor pluralism or 
even constructivism seizes the overlapping domestic and foreign factors that 
are determinant in the making of Lebanese foreign policy as each focuses 
more on a specific level of analysis. 
6.3 Current Constraints to Lebanon’s Foreign Policy 
The current threats and obstacles facing Lebanese foreign policy are 
summarized in the spillover effects of the Syrian war. The geopolitical 
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conflict in Syria poses a major threat to the stability of the sectarian system 
in Lebanon.  The Lebanese domestic scene is divided among those who 
support the Syrian regime and those favoring the opposition. The ongoing 
political and military intervention of Hezbollah as well as other Lebanese 
groups in the Syrian conflict has amplified tensions between Sunnis and 
Shiites in the country, threatening to trigger another sectarian civil war. 
Extremists and Salafis are rising noticeably in the country.  
The Islamic State is at the border of the country clashing with the Lebanese 
army. The Iranian and Saudi Arabia proxy war as well is casting its shadow 
heavily over Lebanon as their Lebanese allies are more focused on serving 
their geopolitical leaders than serving their country. This highlights the role 
of sub-state actors, as independent entity that bandwagon with foreign 
forces and disregard the presence of the state, in the struggle over Lebanese 
foreign policy. As they carry their activity across the borders, the autonomy 
of these sub-state actors grew as the state once again fails.  
The foreign policy battles that have always existed and culminated 
following the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, intensified with the 
participation of Lebanese factions in the Syrian conflict. This highlights the 
failure of the state as well as the confessional system as a whole in Lebanon. 
The system empowered sub-state identity groups and weakened state 
institutions. Personal interest surpassed national interests jeopardizing 
Lebanon’s stability and sovereignty.  
Moreover, “neighboring states such as Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, each 
with their own regional designs, are more than willing to interfere in 
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Lebanese politics when it suits their goals” 353 . Lebanon’s geographical 
location left it vulnerable to penetration by regional forces. Surrounded by 
Israel from the south and Syria from the north and east, both of which are 
“militarily more powerful and at war with each other in a region steeped in 
historic and violent animosities”354 , Lebanon became a battleground for 
such rivalries. When it comes to Israel, its high interest in safeguarding its 
security which finds it roots in its history abundant with fear left it with a 
list of goals that are attained through its intervention in Lebanon
355
.  
As for Syria, its history of fear is rooted in its geographical location 
between Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq. Each one of these 
neighbors posed a security obstacle to Syria. Iraq, for example, was under 
the Baath regime just as Syria, constituted a rival to Assad’s regime with 
Saddam trying to position Iraq as the most powerful regional player
356
. 
Whether to deter the power of other states or to achieve their own interests, 
regional players have played a central role in inhibiting any form of consent 
around a Lebanese foreign policy.  
Although Lebanon has consistently faced similar challenges, this time the 
risks of plunging into another round of warfare are higher as the conflict in 
Lebanon’s backyard intensified. The foreign policy of the country remains 
undetermined as each group continues to conduct its own independent 
policies vis-à-vis foreign actors. Whether Lebanon will face another 
sectarian civil war or not is determined only with time. However, one thing 
is certain; Lebanon’s consociational democracy has failed to prevent the 
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country from sinking into period of political crisis and from the outbreak of 
intense conflict.  
With the intensity of conflict in Syria, The Baabda Declaration did not deter 
some Lebanese groups, like Hozballah and the Future Movement, from 
engaging verbally or physically in the Syrian war. Yet, with all things 
considered, Lebanon is still witnessing precarious stability which kept it 
away from plunging into another civil war. This is due to both internal and 
external factors. Internally, Lebanon’s consociational system has played a 
role in maintaining the current stability in Lebanon as each party is granted 
its share of the rule. There is a consensus among the leading political parties 
and Zu’ama of the country not to drag Lebanon further into a war which no 
part could afford. This has been revealed in the latest statements of major 
leaders such as Hariri, Nasrallah, Geagea and Aoun who called upon their 
followers to support the army and to be caution and avoid being dragged 
into sectarian clashes.  
Externally, Lebanon is no longer an arena for international and regional 
conflict at the present moment, Syria has taken this role. Therefore, internal 
conflicts within Lebanon are no longer high on the agenda of foreign actors, 
reason of which the presidential deadlock remains unsolved. This is also 
another reason to which Lebanese leaders are cautious when it comes to 
engaging into clashes as their foreign allies shifted their focus to Syria.  
Adding to this, the Lebanese Army continues to be the most trusted 
institution that has the support of the majority of the Lebanese from all 
sects. This is due in part to its non-involvement in the civil war, its 
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neutralized position regarding internal conflict and its success in containing 
the spillover of violence from Syria.   
In short, Lebanon’s consociational system, historical experience, and the 
recent role of its army have to a certain extent preserved its precarious 
stability relative to its external environment. However, the mounting danger 
of the Syrian war has also necessitated the prevalence of international 
support for the preservation or protection of its independence as Lebanon 
remains a weak state and a subject to outside influences. 
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